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In The True Believer, Eric Hoffer convincingly demon-
strated that the dangers of fanaticism were substantially independent
of the ends pursued. This did not mean that the end was unimportant
to the success of a mass movement for, in fact, it probably is the
most important motivating factor. However, the nature of the end
does not in and of itself change the fact that misguided proselytizing
for "good" causes can bring about as much damage and suffering as
the "evil" actions of those bent on conquest and rapine. It was
considered "good, " for example, for the United States to drive
Indians onto reservations, for Christians to launch crusades
against the infidel Turk, for America to wage war against Mexico
in 1846 and against Spain in 1898, and for Alexander to conquer
the world. Such characterizations, however, are not and were
not objectively derived.
Similarly, through the eyes of persons brought up in the
American cultural environment, it was "bad" for Sparta to attack
Athens, for Rome to fall to Barbarians, for the Turk to threaten
Europe, for Spain to seek dominion over the New World, and so
forth.




In either case, "good" or "bad" was a label determined in
large part by emotion, cultural or historical context, and a pro-
pensity for people to see things the way they would like them to
be. Thus, today, the notion that somehow the world can and
should be made over in a democratic image has no less potential
for causing heartache and suffering.
Nonetheless, this fact does not alter the possibility that
democracy may have something to offer all the peoples of the
world. And while the possibility surely does not justify prosely-
tizing, it does demand that those who have known and experienced
democratic self-government offer an intelligent explanation of its
theoretical basis. This obligation to accurately describe the
theoretical foundations of self-government is regarded by the
writer as the outstanding challenge to democracy.
THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY
The proliferation of weak, poor and unstable nation-states
in the years following World War II has starkly illustrated the
inadequacy and insufficiency of theoretical knowledge relevant
to the processes of building: (1) democratic national societies
and (2) stable democratic governments. Moreover, it is equally
apparent that this inadequacy and insufficiency of democratic
theory extends to the international arena as well; for the

Vrelationship of the international structure to the idea of demo-
cracy is imprecise, vague and ambiguous.
Yet, if the idea of democracy has universal validity, to
be a relevant alternative it must be illuminated in a manner
that explains why some societies can support stable self-government,
while others, attempting it, have reverted to elitism, autocracy,
or worse; likewise it must be determined in what way the concept
of democracy has relevance to the international community.
If these explanations are not clearly and concisely made,
democracy will ever remain a unique, non -transplantable
commodity which is doomed by its inability to compete either
evangelically as a source of ideological satisfaction or objectively
as a means of meeting concrete social needs; and the international
arena will continue as a hostile, suspicious environment.
The need for such explanations is all the more compelling
because, in the writer's opinion, many of the most vocal spokes-
men for democracy have been inept witnesses. Believers in
that form will recall that an over -optimistic Tom Paine preached
of a democracy that was utopia and that the leaders of the French
Revolution equated the eradication of tyranny with the fulfillment
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of freedom. In the light of all that has passed since those
early years, those of us for whom democracy is the guarantor
deserve to have that blessing better explained, better understood
and better implemented by the leaders and spokesmen of today.
If this is not done, the blessing will become the curse and the
word democracy will simply become the rallying cry of the
extremist and the chant of the mob.
In fact, one could in effect equate democracy to communism
by stating Utopian conditions for the survival of the former, even
as Marx did for communism a century ago. To draw the parallel
further, consider the not uncommon observation that the laudable
but Utopian ends of communism had their origin in an atmosphere
of deep compassion for the desperate social and economic
condition of Western workers and in the teachings of Christianity;
thus, it is not those ends which are false. Rather, it is, princi-
pally, the independent belief that communism can only be
"In 1791 Thomas Paine, one of the world's great publicists
described the accomplishments of the French Revolution as follows:
'Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and the source of
misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its
natural and original place, the nation. ' The consequence of this in
international relations Paine indicates in the succeeding sentence.
'Were this the case throughout Europe, ' he asserts, 'the cause of
war would be taken away. ' Democracy is preeminently the peaceful
form of the state. Control of policy by the people would mean peace
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), p. 101.
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sustained if the entire world is totally transformed. It is
this belief that has given such drive to the related conviction
that until this is brought about nothing that is tactically
expedient is either immoral or beyond the realm of "sober"
3
consideration. In the meantime, the rest of the world has
had to endure in frustration the consequences of this miscon-
ceived notion. And, while it can be said with certainty that
the day will never dawn on a communist Utopia, it is equally
certain that Communist pursuit of that goal will not soon be
abandoned.
On the other hand, democracy could be similarly miscon-
ceived; and the capacity of that error for abusing the rest of
humanity in the name of that misconception would be both
serious and tragic. For this would imply a faith in democracy
so shallow as to require that tyranny be totally destroyed before
the world could be "safe for democracy. " Of course, the world
can never be safe for democracy, but nevertheless, pursuit of
that end could lead to extremes of means that would do great
-3
While communist conservatism, caution, and pragmatism
may be evident in policy and action, the ideological commitment
seems to remain. At the least, it produces considerable tension




violence, not merely to unfortunate individuals, but also to
the Greco -Roman-Hebraic and Christian heritage which is
called Western Civilization, and of which we have such justifiable
right to be proud.
What too often is not apparent is that if neither the spokes-
men for communism nor those for democracy are sufficiently
capable of coming to grips with an imperfect world, nor capable
of being sustained with partial successes, then both are false
prophets. In the case of democracy, this need not be.

FOREWORD
SOME ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES 1
The model discussed in this paper is directed towards the
social and political problems of man which, though occurring in
a material world of precise physical and mathematical relation-
ships, are, nonetheless, the sole result of man's reactions to
the fact of his existence. No argument is made with respect to
why these reactions occur, nor is it held that their causes and
effects can be exactly determined. Rather, it is accepted that
these reactions are related to human nature and that human
nature, whatever it is, is a fact to be taken account of, not to be
3
altered to accord with an idea or a vision as to what it should be.
* The assumptions and values discussed in this foreword are
in the nature of premises which are thought to be required to sup-
port the theoretical model presented in Chapter III. No pretense
is made that the discussion is a definitive treatment of questions
which have been argued for thousands of years. The discussion is
merely intended to show an awareness of the relevance of these
questions and how the author has taken account of them in the devel-
opment of his argument.
2 As, for example, was implicit in the approach of many of
the earlier political philosophers in assuming that man was by
nature disposed to be selfish (Machiavelli), to seek power (Hobbes),
or to be good (Rousseau).
Many movements have sought to change the way in which
man is otherwise supposed to act: Christianity, communism, die
cultural revolution in China are notable examples.

Human Nature
It should be evident from man's extraordinarily diverse
•pursuits of interests that his likes and dislikes are exceedingly-
complex; that human nature, as the mechanism for translating
a stimulus -- whatever its source -- into a response, is far
beyond man's ability to precisely explain. Disentangling the
intertwined causes and effects is itself so much a matter of
human judgment that the effort more properly belongs in the world
of art or metaphysics than of science. Thus psychology in the
medical sense of the term is a poor approach to the ills of
society just because of its focus on the individual and because of
its attempt to be precise in terms of an individual's unique cause-
effect pattern. Even if it were possible to acquire human
nature profiles for every living person, it is impossible that
such a mass of diverse data could be acted on for political benefit.
However, the "psychology" with which the political scientist
is concerned is a different matter. While it may utilize the terms
of the psychologist, it does not attempt to know the individual at
all, but instead merely analyzes and classifies his actions in
human patterns that appear to have empirical validity so far as
group behavior is concerned. This service is worthwhile if it
provides some social and political insight to those concerned with
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government. Of course, this type of "psychology' 1 is really a
mixture of sociology, political science and philosophy with
psychology.
Thus human nature, the classic starting point of the
political theorist, is an artificial model in no way resembling
that which is treated by the psychiatrist. This political human
nature is a convenient means of organizing and classifying data
which are apparently the consequences of some three billion
real and quite individual human natures. For example, "the
will to power" and the "will to live truly" of Reinhold Neibuhr
represent a dichotomy which is useful to the politician but far
too vague to help in the treatment of a sick individual. Similarly,
rational -irrational, spiritual-material, social-non-social, good-
evil, etc. , are useful in treating with social groupings; they do
not, however, accurately diagnose the functioning of an individuals
psyche. They are gross terms applicable to a synthetic or group
human nature.
What is maintained, then, is that human nature is only
relevant, in the social and political realms, in its consequential
manifestations. By this it is meant that while it is absolutely
essential to know as much as possible about man's interests --
which is the term that will be used to describe the consequences
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of his nature after they have become conscious to him - - it is
not necessary to explain how a person's individuality transforms
a stimulus into a response (interest). In other words, the proper
aim of politics is to contain or take account of the gross effects
of human nature by erecting a unifying structure within which the
diversity of human nature can be expressed.
The Nature of Truth
The emphasis on consequences of human nature rather
than cause-effect relationships reflects a somewhat relativistic
outlook; moreover, it appears to reject the belief that truth and
ultimate truth are one and the same and that such knowledge is
4
a prerequisite to universal harmony. But while some violence
is done to the latter, the former belief is not necessarily contra-
dicted; it is simply put into a perspective more in harmony with
the pragmatic requirements of an effective political structure.
Is truth simply a statement of cause and effect, absolute
There are said to be three general approaches to defining
truth:
a. that truth is completely objective and revealed,
b. that truth is completely objective but incompletely re-
vealed or perceived (the Socratic belief).
c. that truth is related to feeling or to perception only
and that it is completely subjective.
The discussion in this section is intended to identify with
definition "b" even though references to relativisim may seem to
indicate a subjective treatment.
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and inflexible? Or is it that which is revealed as a consequence
of living ? The former is ultimate, the latter relative. But it
does not follow that there is an essential difference. What is at
issue is the pretense that ultimate truth in all its fullness can be
revealed to man and the Utopian assumption that a tolerable life
on earth requires such knowledge.
It is generally agreed that human knowledge, while
immense and expanding, is incomplete and probably minuscule
in relation to that which remains to be discovered. People live,
and always have lived, pursuing truth by acquiring knowledge;
yet to what does this acquisition lead? Is life getting better in
terms of value realization? And if the answer is affirmative for
some individuals -- say in the United States -- how is this related
to the quantity of truth? (Since truth is itself supposed to be a
qualitative absolute, absolute truth must refer to the quantity of
truth revealed). Surely there is no reasonable prospect for a
worldly existence founded on ultimate truth.
But, like human nature, which can only be known through
its consequences, politicians should not find such a deficiency
in knowledge a bar to effective government. For again the
problem is one of erecting a structure which takes untruth into
account by feedback which serves to correct and to compensate
for its disintegrative effects. Truth, then is tentative; it is

XIV
synonymous with that which is generally and responsibly re-
garded as truth. It is, or should be, subject to modification
5to take into account new discoveries. In short, truth can be
said to be an expression consistent -- up to the moment of its
utterance -- with the totality of human knowledge at that time;
it will be ultimate only at such time as human knowledge is
complete
.
The implication of the foregoing, that the truth man knows
now is not necessarily the truth that man will know, is surely
wretched if one has placed his hopes for man's future in the
steady accumulation of objective bits of truth, or in theological
c
Particularly in the area of social theory: for example,
what is the relationship of job training and income maintenance
to the breaking of the poverty cycle? Can civil rights legislation
achieve the integration of minority groups into the life and actions
of society ?
6
The debt to cybernetics is obvious: government is a
system, it is purposeful, and it is dynamic; thus it is subject
to control theory. There is no need for a government to always
make the "right" or "correct" decision in an objective sense.
What is important is that decisions be made on the basis of what
is thought to be correct at the time with the realization that re-
vision and refinement undoubtedly will be necessary; or, that
decisions knowingly be made for experimental purposes with the
knowledge that the underlying truth just is not known. An excellent
discussion of cybernetics is contained in Norbert Weiner,
Cybernetics (2nd ed. ; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1961), Chapters
IV and X; see also Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management
(New York: John Wiley and Sons , 1959), pp. 28-57.
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revelations of truth. The implication cannot be avoided. Truth
is related to experience; it is as much a human creation as it is
a human discovery. Truth may be objective but at any one
instant it cannot be described as more than what one takes it to
be. While this is relativism, it is not meant to imply that truth
is subjective. It is only to take note of the fact that because man
is the agent through which truth is exposed, knowledge of the
7truth must of necessity remain relative to his intellectual activity.
This paper leans heavily on the concept of a functional truth
that expands and revises itself in direct correspondence with man's
gintellectual activity.
Good and Evil
The two extreme arguments with respect to good and evil
are (1) that morality is a requirement 'imposed on man by a
higher source independent of man's social and political condition;
Q
and (2) that morality is a product of man's social condition.
7
For society but not necessarily for the individual since he
may reject any new truth which contradicts or seems to require
revision of that which he already "knows. "
° See footnote 4. Truth is relative only by virtue of man's
inability to perceive it clearly. This differs from subjective
concepts of truth which might also be thought of as relativistic
.
^ These two extreme positions identify, respectively, with
the Stoic doctrine of natural law as stated by Cicero in his Republic




The first argument is the natural law doctrine and its im-
plications are (1) that there is one standard of morality applicable
to all of mankind whether or not they all are members of the
same society and (2) that what comprises the body of natural law
can be inferred through correct or right reasoning. In practice
it requires skilled interpreters with the power to propagate their
findings if it is to have effect. But because these interpreters
are humans whose especial qualifications are subject to challenge,
natural law -- even when it recognizes gradations between the
fixed and universal and the changing and particular -- is of greater
value to the philosopher than to the pragmatic political scientist.
The second argument is termed positivism. It argues that
as a result of his experience in society man has created morality.
Thus it is more flexible in allowing for differences in moral
standards where two or more different societies are concerned.
And because it is held that morality is a social creation rather
than a fixed law, it is amenable to "legislation" of differences
whereas the logic of natural law forces it to proselytize. Thus,
positivism is inherently the more politically oriented of the two
doctrines and it is obviously the perspective from which this
paper is written. Of course, neither the substance of morality
nor its durability necessarily is different, within a society,
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regardless of its supposed origin.
As to whether man is disposed to good or evil, to both, or
to neither it is important to reaffirm that it is the consequences
of human nature with which the author is concerned. To take a
position one way or the other is unnecessary and is certain to
invite controversy. The fact is that a sufficient number of the
consequences of human nature are visible as to afford a reasonably
accurate guide for political purposes. Thus there exists an un-
broken record wherever history has been recorded which reveals
that whether or not it is because of his nature or in spite of it
man just the same has the capacity for both good and evil --in
terms of his own standards at the time of his actions.
Whether or not good and evil are absolute or relative is
subject to debate and is an argument which cannot be answered to
everyone's satisfaction. What is important is the knowledge that
man is the agent for perceiving good and evil and, for better or
for worse, good and evil must remain what he thinks they are; some
disagreement is inevitable and it is a function of political systems
to reconcile different points of view, legislating if necessary.
What constitutes good and evil is absolutely vital to society; why
something is good or evil is not important from a political point




One need not say that there is no such thing as an ultimate
standard or set of values by which good and evil are determined.
However, one must regard as suspect any claims for a particu-
lar listing. If such values gain acceptance within society or between
societies they in effect become socially determined norms and can
be factors of unity and cohesion and their origin is of no conse-
quence. However, if projected unilaterally into the non-social
vacuum between societies, the values would find no regular insti-
tution by which acceptance could be reliably decided. The issue
of right or wrong, good or evil could only be decided by such means
as were at hand -- which in the extreme instance could mean force.
Perfection and Imperfection
Interwoven with man's concepts of good and evil are his
concepts of perfection --or imperfection. For example, there is
the idea that the world man lives in is imperfect; that man is im-
perfect, that his creations are imperfect. The thought has given
solace to many; to an equal number it has been a source of
l^This, of course, was the situation existing between states
which led Grotius in 1625 to develop a positivist international law






frustration. Another idea is that imperfect though the world
may be, man and his rationality can create a world that is
perfect. This idea has given great drive to individuals and
masses alike. Both ideas are misconceived.
The belief that there is imperfection in the world or in
man depends on an implicit assumption that criteria for per-
fection exist. Yet if perfection is achievement of the ultimate
good then it must be defined so that it can serve as a goal; but
again there is the problem of who is to define this ultimate good
in the interval between the imperfect present and ultimate
perfection.
In sum, the implications of the perfection-imperfection
concept are (1) that the ultimate good can be achieved on earth
or (2) that human existence is essentially an imperfect exper-
ience and will remain thus. Optimism clashes with pessimism,
fools with cynics and to what end? Concepts which compare
man's performance with a standard of perfection merely
enslave the human mind and do mischief to the political
process
.
Man is obviously imperfect in the sense that he falls
short of his own standards but the political world can well do
without the comparison of man's conduct to a standard of
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perfection. The political world is what man makes of it
and it is the process of doing and making that constitutes
human history. Justice and injustice are better concepts to
serve man's relativistic needs.
Justice and Injustice
Can justice be done ? Or is this too an illusion created
in the confusion of the ultimate with the present?
Many believe that justice can be objectified and dispensed
to all of mankind. And perhaps they are right if the definition
of that which comprises justice can be watered down and kept
within narrow limits.
But the human record suggests that justice is regarded
as something else. It is not something fixed and unchangeable.
What is held to be just seems always to be changing. Legal
justice is pursued closely by social and economic justice; and
what constitutes each seems to be relative to the state of
political or social or economic development within a society.
Laws are standards of justice and it is worth noting that in
Cf, Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), "Perfectionism and Utopia, " pp.
51-68. This chapter starts with the thought that "If democracy
is threatened from without by realists, it is even more seriously
threatened from within by perfectionists. . . "
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societies beyond the traditional stage laws are constantly being
changed.
Justice is then the ability of a society, first, to conceive
of that which is just and, second, to pursue it continuously and
effectively. Thus no society can ever be satisfied that it has
fulfilled itself. It is enough that it is seeking to eliminate the
uneven distribution of social values and that it is creating new
standards and new methods by which uneveness can be eliminated
or reduced.
Justice is, then, something of a tautology: it is the elimi-
nation of injustice. It is not in the achievement but in the pursuit
that justice is found. The unequal distribution of social values
can never be completely eliminated; but the just society does
have the capacity of recognize injustice and the equally important
capacity for peaceful change.
How a society pursues peaceful change raises the question
of ends and means.
Ends and Means
No aspect of society has been more troublesome than the
relationship of ends to means. Nicollo Machiavelli had perhaps
as clear an understanding of it as any political theorist who
has limited himself to the examination of the consequences of
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human thoughts and actions. But he was, and still is, greatly-
misunderstood; also his words themselves are misleading:
"It is well that, when the act accuses him, the result should
12
excuse him, " he advised his readers. Yet this cannot be
boiled down to the simple proposition that the ends justify the
means, nor did he have in mind so simple a message.
Ends and means are related within society by the values,
laws and institutions of that society; in extra -social situations
-- that is, for example, between societies where there is neither
a common value system nor common institutions of peaceful
change -- they are not. In other words, within society social
ends are pursued by legal means. This means, first of all, that
such a society has a value and political system by which it can
identify that which is a legitimate, or social, goal and, second,
that the society regulates or restrains itself so that in pursuing
its goals it does not damage or destroy its own value system.
In short, the means are "legal. "
But in an extra -social situation such as existed between
nation-states prior to the mid -seventeenth century, such a rela-
tionship is impossible. In fact, not only the value systems of the
Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New
York: The Modern Library, 1940), p. 139. (Discourses, Bk I, 9).
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respective societies may be in jeopardy but also the existence
of the societies themselves. Customs applicable to such con-
frontations have indeed arisen and by their existence an inchoate
social condition can be said to exist. For example, diplomacy,
custom, and international law plus the several states are said to
13
constitute the international system. But the very facts that
the community is inchoate and that certainty of justice is
missing makes it necessary for the separate states to supple-
ment that which exists with whatever their wit and resources
can provide. What is a social good for one society is often a
social evil for another. And standards of legality within one
society may, if applied extra -socially, jeopardize the other
society's existence. Thus, in this situation, necessary ends
14
must be regarded as justifying such means as ensure them.
13
See footnote 10. Following the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648 and the acceptance of state sovereignty and international
law a partial and inchoate relationship was established. The rudi-
mentary nature of the system, however, still required war as a
means of reconciling differences. See Whittle Johnston, "Little
America - Big America, " The Yale Review (Autumn 1968), pp. 3-10
*4 Machiavelli employed a similar qualification: ". . . In
the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there
is no appeal , the end justifies the means, " (Emphasis supplied. )
The words "from which there is no appeal" are a direct reference
to the extra-social relationships which characterized the inter-




This does not end the matter, however, for in practice
societies do tend to project their internal values into the
extra-social vacuum. And if their respective value systems
are similar it is possible to foresee a bilateral modus vivendi
resulting. If not, the differences may lead to confrontation
and conflict, with no satisfactory mechanism or institution
to aid in their resolution.
However, while societies have historically failed to
15
reach meaningful agreement on extra-social means, they
still have found autolimitation of their actions expedient for
several reasons:
First, the habit of self-limitation acquired by officials as
a result of their experience living within a domestic social
system. This may include the feeling that there exists a quasi -
international value structure even though it is unaccompanied
by formal institutions.
Second, the uniqueness of the occasion and the unfamiliarity
of most officials with inventing "appropriate" extra -legal means
for an extra -social environment.
15
Except to agree that war is legal --an agreement which




Third, fear or uncertainty as to the overall effect of
employing "unconventional" means.
Fourth, the danger to the internal value system of the
society. People who could not disentangle the rationales of
the two separate standards -- the one social and legal, and the
other extra -social and extra-legal -- might be either honestly
confused or transformed into cynics. Others might understand
why a dual standard exists but nonetheless question the appro-
priateness of departing from "legal" (internal) means. And
even those sophisticated enough to understand and support the
idea of a dual standard must recognize that a lack of self-
restraint is a poor basis for settling lesser differences in the
future. It seems likely that a democratic state could not for
long maintain a Western value system. with the single criterion
that externally "good" ends justify unrestrained or unlimited
means.
Finally, it must be recognized that means employed
extra -socially have an unavoidable spill-over internally. For
For example, nuclear weapons are, in theory, simply
larger in scale than conventional weapons. Yet the impact of
their destructive power on human existence and on civilization is
so uncertain, the moral implications so grave, the possibility
that any isolated instance could be a Pandora's Box so serious




example, one cannot deceive an enemy without deceiving one's
own citizens and the more active the propaganda directed at
the enemy, the greater the effect at home as well. Efficiency
in the field may involve suppression of dissent at home. And
the necessity of preserving a democratic image in order to main-
tain the necessary public support could easily be seen as justifi-
cation for tyrannizing those who seek to uncover the truth. A
gulf could open between a society and its government, a gulf
whose existence would represent great damage to the foundations
of democratic government.
Thus, although it may be said that in extra-social situations
"good" ends may justify whatever means are required, nonetheless
various reasons usually operate to impose restraint.
j* *i* 4si* "i* i*
In reflecting on such matters as justice and injustice, right
and wrong, good and evil, perfection and imperfection, or ends
and means one is struck by the obse rvation that if it were indeed
possible to objectify these values and to set forth what they were
once and for all there would be no need for what is thought of as
either freedom or liberty. There would only be a need to state
the values, establish a government, and charge it with the respon-
sibility of efficiently pursuing the stated goals. Diversity and
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pluralism would only complicate and delay fulfillment of the
absolute values described. Tolerance would become an evil
(isn't tolerance recognition that in a certain matter absolute
truth is uncertain?). Mercy would have no virtue (isn't mercy
self-doubt or a feeling that the person charged is not completely
at fault?). The only criterion for such a government would be
efficient pursuit of the stated values.
Thus it is the very fact that values, even the most important
values, cannot be stated once and for all that has created the
desirability of democratic government. For in the final analysis
the virtue of democracy is the belief that a society must be its
own judge of what its values are. Freedom and liberty as well
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Democratic government may not be a viable form for
all peoples, for every society, for each culture. Nor should
it be the responsibility of any one nation to attempt to proselytize
for it. Nevertheless, the idea of democratic government seems
to have an elemental appeal, even for peoples and societies who
have not known its blessings. For those who have, it should be
their responsibility at least to describe their model accurately.
This has not always been done in the past, with the result that
unreasonable expectations often have been associated with
democracy's more visible institutions -- e.g., universal suffrage,
representative government, checks and balances, the party system,
etc. Nor has it always been made clear that the more accurately
a government reflects the moods and desires of its people, the
more accurately it also will mirror the imperfections of society
itself. Abetter understanding of the basis for democratic govern-
ment should include a description of the relationship of the idea
of democracy to man, to society, and to government. This paper
discusses some implications of a theoretical model which focuses




This paper is concerned with the theoretical and structural
bases for democracy. It assumes that order and freedom are
critical components, that society must be treated as a concept
distinct from government and from state and that practical norms
can be established for democratic societies as well as for the
overall democratic process.
In addition, this paper also reflects the belief that broad
philosophical ideas can be practical devices for dealing with the
difficult problems of organizing political structures, that demo-
cracy has philosophic truth in its favor and that, from a qualita-
tive standpoint, democracy wherever found has certain basic
features and common norms, though these features and norms do
1,2
vary over a wide quantitative range.
The basis for the first two beliefs will, in part, be argued in
Chapter III. However, a completely separate theoretical basis for
democratic government can be evolved on the basis of (1) its consis-
tency with the concept of cybernetics and (2) evidence that cybernetics
is in turn a field theory applicable to all man-designed, purposeful
systems (as well as governing biological systems and their evolution).
While this consideration is outside the scope of this paper, it is,
nonetheless, relevant to the premise. See footnote 6, the Foreword.
2
With respect to the third belief, the writer has in mind, inter
alia, the provision for seeking out consensus even in tribal societies
and in the city-states of the ancient world. See Frederick Watkins,
The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957), pp. 93-94. Also, Cf . , Barrington Moore, Jr.,
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Pr
1967), especially the note, "Problems in Comparing European and
Asian Political Processes, " pp. 159-161.
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The particular aim of this paper is, with the use of a
theoretical model, to discuss the above concerns, assumptions
and beliefs as part of an integrated whole which grows out of
man's pursuit of unity in diversity and his concurrent attempts
to deal with an existence characterized in large part by ambi-
guity, ambivalence and imperfection. In so doing, the writer
hopes to shed light on the reasons why the transplantation of
democratic government often has proven so difficult --in fact,
so conspicuously unsuccessful -- whether sponsored by native
or alien forces.
Democ racy
Democracy is a term which cannot be used with precision.
It has varying definitions and has been -- and is being -- used
3
in pursuit of grossly differing purposes. However, no definition
or use of the term can escape the rather minimal implication that
the word describes a government under the control of the people
it governs.
These three common elements -- people, government and
3
Giovanni Sartori begins his book Democratic Theory (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) with a quotation of George
Orwell: "In the case of a word like democracy not only is there
no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from
all sides. . . . The defenders of any kind of regime claim that it is
a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word
if it were tied down to any one meaning. " ("Politics and the English
Language," in Selected Essays, Baltimore, 1957, p. 149.)

degree of control -- are what one is talking about whether it is
4democracy at the international level, at the national level or at
some lower or local level. In short, this political form neces-
sarily involves the relationship of people on the one hand to their
government on the other. Thus, while states may pretend to have
personalities, emotions, the right to exist -- indeed, to possess
a full range of human attributes -- such pretensions are not them-
selves central to the question of whether or not there can be a
basis for the formation of a democratic international community
or a basis for the creation of democracy at the international level.
Rather, the central question is whether a structure at the inter-
national level can show itself responsive to the needs of a society
which controls it, and whether it can take account of the social
laws which affect society. If this is a practical question it is also
theoretical.
Ambiguity
If democracy is first of all a theoretical concept, its foun-
dations at the international level might be assumed to be the same
The question of whether there is, is not or can be democracy
at the international level is purposely left until after the theoretical
discussion in Chapter VI. However, it is obvious that an inter-
state relationship is by definition extra-democratic since it Involves
states rather than people as actors.
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as for democracy at other levels and these foundations should
reflect whatever truths govern the social conduct of man. Man's
social conduct does seem to reflect the fact that existence is by-
nature ambiguous and an understanding of existence would seem
to require that the particular ambiguities facing man in society-
be taken into account. Even that in life which is held to be "good"
is constrained by this interpretation, and this fact has led Paul
Tillich to refer to what he calls "the American irony" as "the
5
ambiguity of perfection. " The general framework for the
attempt in this paper to deal with man's political confusion over
the fact of ambiguity is stated in terms of the idea of unity in
diversity.
Unity in Diversity
The concept of unity in diversity .characterizes the human
struggle as one aimed at reconciling problems of "the one and
the many, " problems whose effects often appear to be mutually
exclusive. Thus, man may conceive of the need for unity and
5
Paul Tillich, "The Ambiguity of Perfection, " Time (17
May 1963), p. 69.
° Unity in diversity can be a description of the political process
in a democratic state as well as a dichotomy for characterizing the
more fundamental impulses of man in society. For example,
Jeffersonian description of electioneering in the United States in his
first innaugural address has been so characterized in William Y.
Elliott and Neil A. MacDonald, Western Political Heritage (New York:
Prentice -Hall, 1949), pp. 897-900.
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the need for diversity in one or another of its manifestations,
such as order and freedom. But in pursuing the both he finds
that fulfillment of the one subtracts from realization of the other.
As the contest in political matters between order and freedom
suggests, it is not easy to attain a satisfactory balance of the two.
And, in frustration or because of an imbalance in their value systems,
some men have been led to deny the validity, as a goal, of either
unity or diversity in order to focus single -mindedly on the pursuit
of the one not rejected. Specifically, this may be a case of rejec-
ting freedom in favor of order, or it may be the reverse.
There is, then, a certain irony in these efforts whose con-
sequences appear to produce undesirable as well as desirable
effects; and it is indeed strange that if both unity and diversity
are considered to be "good, " the maximization of the one should
serve to minimize the other. No wonder it is said -- politically
as well as materially -- that man cannot have his cake and eat
it too.
Yet while it certainly appears that the consequences of
man's efforts are ironic, and that a synthesis of unity and diversity
is illusory, it is possible that the foregoing is a highly inaccurate
perception of the true relationship of unity to diversity or, more
at point, of order to freedom. Indeed, it can be seen that a rather
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satisfactory realization of both order and freedom has existed in
some political communities from time to time; and, in a rough
manner, this can be said to describe the recent experience of
most of the states of the democratic West, which have known
over extended periods relative internal stability and peaceful
political change within the confines of their respective domestic
jurisdictions. Who can deny, for example, that this has been
true, in the main, in the United States, in Canada and in Great
Britain; or, to a lesser extent, in France and other states of
Western Europe? Moreover, most men who are familiar with
the traditions of the great Western states think of democracy as
the only tolerable method of government.
As it is known in the West, the practice of democracy in-
cludes a number of rather mechanistic concepts such as repre-
sentative government, majority rule, checks and balances,
universal suffrage, etc. Also, it is said to mean freedom; it is
said to be a way of life; and it is said to be concerned with the
individual and his personal liberties.
But when emotion is removed from the above words, they
offer very little practical and concrete assistance for those who
would seek to transplant democracy to alien soil. And, applied
at the international level, democratic methods have proved a

certain prescription for conflict, disunity and structural
i
7irrelevance.
Thus, with few exceptions, democracy has not flourished
other than where it has evolved as a part of a nation's overall
o
heritage. Even in the West, democracy's record is uneven and
blemished; in the non-West -- Japan excepted -- most efforts to
transplant a "hot house" brand of democracy have failed cata-
strophically.
The reasons for democracy's apparent failure constitute
no enigma. As a matter of fact, a great many specific and valid
criticisms generally are presented in each case where democratic
government has been tried and has failed to take root. But because
it is obviously hypersensitive to culture, environment, an efficient
enemy and a nation's past experience is no reason to conclude that
democracy has nothing to offer the disadvantaged, the under-
developed and those nations whose total experience has been to
•7
If the League of Nations and the United Nationa Organization
can be regarded as attempts to apply domestic democratic tech-
niques at the international level, it can be argued that they are
examples of conspicuous failure.
This is not to deny Kennan's observation that ". . .the
creation of higher political forms has normally been a process
of erosion from despotism. .. " George F. Kennan, Realities of




know intimately the infinite forms of tyranny, despotism and
anarchy.
The fact is that democratic government is a blessing only
for a democratic society. And what constitutes a democratic
society is a matter so little understood in newly -emergent nations
that this fact alone could account for most failures at democratic
nation -building. Such a society cannot be assumed into existence
and then crowned with a constitution made elsewhere. Neither
can one build a democratic society simply by recognizing that
this is the key problem and getting a loan from an international
agency or a rich and friendly nation. A democratic society
need not be a westernized society. On the contrary, indigenous
cultural values can be a factor of strength. However, the society
must reconcile its impulses to unity and to diversity. If it can
accomplish this, it is getting close to the deeper meaning of
democracy.
Of course, there can be no effective long range plan for
building a society, democratic or otherwise. The task is far
too complex, as the efforts to restructure Soviet society seem
Q
to confirm; However, it is fair to say that every society has
° This has reference to the fact that when the Bolsheviks des-
troyed so many of the institutions of Russian society, the government
and party were left with the impossible task of replacing them. The
impossibility of consciously rebuilding the society except over a
period of many years, it can be argued, made police rule i: Me.
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more to build on than can easily be seen. And given an under-
standing of the theoretical nature of democracy, the first step,
at least, can be taken; surely, thousands more must follow --
and with the certain knowledge that the charted course will often
change under the weight of accumulated experience.
It appears, then, that the previous reference to having
and eating cake is not an apt analogy. Heaven on earth is surely
beyond man's reach; but unity in diversity - - to a degree --is
possible. If it is possible in a degree adequate to relieve some
of the grosser effects of a unity that is divisive or a diversity
that is anarchic then it is a worthwhile substitute for any more
Utopian and ultimate goal. But practical success requires a
sound theoretical foundation. Thus, a theoretical examination
of democracy whether at the national level or at the international
level requires the comprehensive argument which follows. It is
not an optimistic argument and is surely not deterministic. It is,
however, a means of gauging the gap between aspiration and
achievement, between theory and reality.
II . UNITY IN DIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZING CONCEPT
The first observation that will be made is in the nature of
a premise: that it is the never ending purpose of men in society
-- as seen explicitly in their statements of the idea itself,
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implicitly in their statements of goals and values, and elsewhere
in the observable consequences of their conduct -- to seek a
condition of unity in diversity and to maintain such an equilibrium.
A second premise flows from the foregoing: that because
this basic idea, this philosophical concept of unity in diversity,
is both universal and timeless, it is strikingly suited to form the
foundation of a general theory of politics and society.
Finally, unity in diversity is --in addition to nature's
great example of a pluriverse within a universe -- construed
to be a social phenomenon. It is a product of society and, in
effect, an expression of the completeness or incompleteness of
social integration. To the extent that people or groups of people
remain unrelated socially -- that is, so long as extra-social
conditions exist -- unity in diversity is beyond attainment. Thus
a social relationship can be said to be a precondition to the
attainment of unity in diversity in the political realm.
The first premise, while presumably subject to empirical
proof, does not appear to warrant a searching enquiry in this
endeavor. It is hoped that it is sufficiently non-controversial to
allow the argument to proceed. The validity of the second
10
It is recognized that the term "unity in diversity" is not
a common way of describing human purpose. What is contended
is that (1) human purpose can be inferred from human actions and
statements, and, (2) that unity in diversity is a term descriptive
of this conduct. This is obviously an existenialist interpretation
of existence since it focuses on the apparent contradictions and the




premise will be argued in the pages to follow. The final premise
is also argumentative.
Whether or not the idea of unity in diversity is the ultimate
,
God-given purpose of human existence will not be argued, for
such knowledge is irrelevant to politics. Politics, in the broad
sense, is the business of finding answers to the problems raised
by the fact that man lives in relation to other men, in society so
to speak. Thus it is the consequences of human thoughts and
actions that have concerned man and as long as this remains the
case there always will be time enough to consider the question of
ultimate purpose.
This is not to say that the meaning of human existence in
a causal or ultimate sense should not be pursued; it should be;
and, like the mystery of human nature-, it will be studied by those
who find such pursuits valuable for their own reasons. But such
contemplations of ultimate causes are not necessary to consideration
of the political problems of man. For by the consequences of his
day to day thoughts and actions he already has generated and is
continuing to generate a political purpose independent of any




It will be maintained then that the consequence -revealed
purpose of human existence is the pursuit of unity in diversity
in a form which can be described as the phenomenon of community.
This pursuit is concerned specifically with order and freedom.
And its goal is to effect that "harmony of the whole which does
not destroy the vitality of its parts. " The thoughts that
follow are an effort to integrate this universal and timeless
purpose into a meaningful theoretical framework.
A phrase of George Santayana which Reinhold Niebuhr has
used to define "the good. " Quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary
Theory in International Relations , (Englewood Cliffs , N. J.: Prent.
Hall, Inc., I960), p. 23.

CHAPTER II
THE BELL CURVE HYPOTHESIS
Introduction
Having said that human purpose is the pursuit of unity in
diversity and that this finds its expression in organized society
in the pursuit of order in freedom through institutions of
community, it remains to translate what is a vague abstraction
into a tighter and more meaningful framework. This leads to a
final contention: that graphically unity in diversity may be
depicted by the so-called probability or bell curve (which is also
known as a curve of standard distribution and as a Gaussian
curve).
There are subjective reasons to support this contention
but, like many other ideas, the origin of the stimulus giving
rise to it is, in the end, unimportant. The validity of the conten
tion will be demonstrated by its speculative value.
The bell curve model, as described in this chapter is an
imperfect form containing several ambiguities and logical in-
consistencies. However, by sticking to it as a graphical repre-
sentation of unity in diversity (order in freedom), the writer is
forced to re -define the variables in order to maintain the fiction
of the premise. Implication follows implication, new definitions
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are required and eventually a new model emerges (Chapter IV)
much more consistent with the varying social and political forms
of man, in and out of society. In this chapter only the original
crude model will be described. But contemplation of it will help
in understanding the evolution of the theory.
The Bell Curve
The probability, or bell, curve has a maximum ordinate
of unity at its center; its ordinates approach zero assymtotically
as the abscissae reach plus and minus infinity. (See Figure 1. )
If the curve is taken as representative of a political community
or of a society it might be said that the right hand portion repre-
sents the forces in that community or society of unity while the
left hand portion represents the forces of diversity. Further
it might be argued that the intensity of the forces of unity or of
diversity are a function of their distance from the vertical axis.
(See Figure Z.) And if it is hypothesized that within political
communities the manifestations of unity and diversity are order
and freedom, then these values may be substituted in the graph
for unity and diversity respectively. (See Figure 3.)
At this point is it evident that several difficulties have
arisen. First, if there is such a thing as intensity of the forces
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units ? Second, what are "forces" of order and freedom? Are
these merely nebulous conceptions, the products of abstract
speculations ? If they cannot be objectified and, at least in theory,
quantified then there is no practical value to the model. Third,
it has been hypothesized that the curve itself represents a
political community. But is that logically consistent? Is a
political community solely the product of forces of order and
freedom? If indeed these are the dynamic forces of a community
of people what happens in the event that an actual government is
not representative of these forces and is maintained by forces
2
outside of the political community itself? Fourth, there is the
question of the bell curve. Are all political communities to be
represented thusly ? Or is the bell curve merely a norm to which
Cf . Richard W. Van Wagenen, Research in the International
Organization Field (Princeton; Center for Research on World
Political Institutions, Princeton University, 1952), Chapter I and
II for a discussion of sense of community, integration, and secur
community; also, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the
International Level (Garden City, New York: Doubleday ^ Co.,
Inc., 1954), Chapters 2-4, which discuss the meanings and kinds
of community, the activities and relationships which constitute
a community, and how communities originate and evolve.
For example, a colonial government or a traditional
autocracy where the ruling elite constitute only a tiny percentage
of the numbers of a society.
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the actual condition can be compared? Fifth, what is the sig-
nificance of the fact that different communities might be repre-
sented by different shaped curves ? And finally, order and freedom,
or unity and diversity, are depicted as being antithetical. Does
this mean that one must cancel out the other?
At first glance the foregoing questions seem to challenge
any utility the model might be thought to possess. In fact, how-
ever, they merely indicate the directions in which additional
reflection is needed. All of the questions will be answered in the
following chapters but it might be useful at this point to indicate
the general nature of the answers.
3
Intensity of order and freedom . The unit through which
forces of order and freedom are expressed is the individual; and
the individual is the basic unit of the political community. There-
fore, the intensity with which the forces of order and freedom
are manifested within a political community can be said to be
directly related to the number, or percentage, of individuals within
3 Intensity of order and freedom is concerned with quanti-
fying these two concepts. It should not be confused with the
problem of intensity of preference with respect to an interest as
discussed by Dahl. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic
Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 43 if
and p. 90 ff. Intensity of preference is certainly a factor in assa\
the effect of various interests on social (and hence, political) stability
See footnote 13, Chapter III, and footnote 5, Chapter V.
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that community who are so affected. In other words, one dimen-
sion of order and freedom is public consensus.
Identifying order and freedom. Obviously, the idea of a
lump force of order or of freedom is an unmanageable analytical
quantity. Besides, while people talk about order and freedom,
they act and respond in terms of more empirically identifiable
stimuli which might be thought of as separate and distinct
"interests. " It is these interests which reflect the unseen forces
of order and freedom and are their visible manifestation. This
means that if the diverse interests of the political community can
be identified, classified as order -dominant or freedom -dominant
in nature, then the percentage consensus can be measured for
each interest. The number of interests is the second dimension
of order and freedom.
Political community vs . sense of community . It now seems
evident that what is described by a plot of consensus versus
interests is not at all an institutionalized political community.
Instead, it adds up merely to a sense of community. The actual
institutions of a political community may or may not take into
account the public consensus. For the time being, then, order
and freedom -dominant interests will be discussed with regard to
their relationship to sense of community; the relationship of sense
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of community to political community will be taken up in a
later chapter.
The bell curve norm. Another observation which flows
from this discussion is the extreme unlikelihood that any politi-
cal community's sense of community will do more than approach
the shape of a bell curve. The bell curve will simply serve as
a postulated norm against which actual sense of community can
be compared. Its advantages for this purpose will be discussed
in Chapter IV along with the significance to be attached to the
varying shapes of actual curves of sense of community.
Order and freedom. It might be argued that neither unity
and diversity nor order and freedom are antithetical to one
another, that in fact they bear some other relationship such as
that of perpendicular forces. However, there appears to be
little or no evidence to support such a contention. The traditional
relationship is accepted herein and in support thereof it will
merely be observed that in the physical world electrons and
protons carry opposite charges but are not opposites in other
respects -- for example, they both have mass. Moreover,
electrons and protons may combine to form neutrons, uncharged
particles that nevertheless possess a mass equal to the combined
mass of the electrons and portons from which they were formed.
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If the above is an apt analogy it would seem to suggest
that even though order and freedom are antithetical in nature,
they do not necessarily cancel each other out of existence. In
fact, since it is contended that order and freedom are mani-
fested through interests that well may be concrete, it is likely
that both order and freedom coexist because the interests to
which they are attached are not in themselves antithetical.
As an example, a freedom -dominant interest might be that
of securing and safeguarding civil liberties while an order
-
dominant interest might involve regulating interstate commerce
Though the two examples reflect fundamentally opposite forces
of diversity and unity, or freedom and order, it is readily con-
ceivable that the same individual could hold to both interests
4
without feeling any internal contradiction.
This conclusion has, therefore, significant theoretical
implications, for it suggests that unity and diversity are mere
classifications accorded to numerous stimuli* Unless the
stimuli, or interests, are of themselves opposite in nature, the
Cf. Frederick Watkins, The political Tradition of the
West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 98f.
In discussing Rousseau's development of the general will,
Watkins notes Rousseau's contention that man can desire at
the same time "two mutually incompatible ends. "
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individual may pursue some of each more or less simul-
taneously. His self then becomes the unifying framework for the
pursuit of diverse, oppositely classified interests. And while
the ideas of unity and diversity may represent contradictory
pulls within the individual's value structure, because values
are a product of environment and environment is constantly
changing, a spatial separation develops between interests:
never can a person react exactly the same to a given stimulus
recurring at a different point in time.
The question of priority. There still remains another
aspect of unity in diversity which in the order-freedom mani-
festation is relevant to the bell curve theory. Is unity or
diversity the prior condition?
It has been argued both ways. For example, is it govern-
ment that makes possible the development of society? Or is it
the other way? Aristotle took the position that "the whole is
necessarily prior to the part, " a position supported by Karl
Deutsch in his Political Community at the International Level.
But the opposite seems to be just as true and John Dewey,
among others, has argued that the raison d'etre of governments
Deutsch, op. cit . , p. 6,
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develops as a result of social development, i.e. -- from the
broader consequences of interests privately pursued.
It is true, of course, that all of being is unified in the
ultimate simplicity of the term universe. At the same time, it
is equally true that man lives existentially in a pluriverse.
Man is certainly not unaware that he is within a universe, and
the ceaseless efforts of some to give purpose to human existence
is indicative of a belief that humanity is somewhere unified by a
purpose that escapes unanimous perception. But day by day man
pursues his interests in infinite variety, number, and complexity
with not much more than passing thought to his reference frame-
work, the whole of which he is but a part.
In a like manner, life within a political community takes
note of the fact of that community's existence only when the
community threatens man or is itself threatened by other forces.
For the most part, private energies, even though in some cases
state directed, do not impinge on the fact of the state's existence.
And so it is with the individual; his unitary existence is a
fact necessary to his infinite expressions of individuality. Yet
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Allan
Swallow, 1954) (Original edition by Henry Holt & Co. , 1927), pp.
12 -22. Both views are inconclusive on this point, however, since
both seem to presuppose the existence of at least an inchoa*. i
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it is only when this existence is threatened that he pauses in his
existential pursuits and takes account of the other half of reality,
7
of truth.
It would seem then that the unifying shell or framework of
the universe, of the state, of society or of the individual is at
least a necessary condition to their pluralistic functioning.
This does not mean, however, that they are prior conditions.
For what is a universe that is not also a pluriverse ? What is a
state that does not have administrative and operational functions?
What is a society without social intercourse ? What is an individual
without his individuality? A structure must be supported by parts
and the idea of a structure without parts is impossible to con-
ceive. Such things are purely imaginary, like the existence of a
point.
7
"Raymond Aron begins his monumental work Peace and
War with the words, 'troubled times encourage meditation. ' ...
Turbulent eras have been rich in philosophical enquiry. Aron,
like Toynbee, Morgenthau, and Niebuhr in earlier writings, reminds
us that Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics coincided with the
crises of the Greek city-state. Hobbes Leviathan and Spinoza's
Tractatus were produced during the religious wars that 'lacerated'
Europe in the seventeenth century. Locke wrote during the century
of the English Revolution. Montesquieu and Rousseau developed
their concepts of representative and democratic governments as the
French prepared to exchange traditional monarchy for a revolution.:-
regime. . ." Kenneth W. Thompson, "Theory and International Studies
in the Cold War" in Abdul A. Said (Editor), Theory of International
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 26.
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What is possible to conceive is a framework with a minimum
number of parts. And if this minimum number escapes percep-
tion it may appear that the whole can be prior. At the same time
such a whole is bound to be less than it appears, as witness, in
the political world, by "perfect" constitutions which have little
effect.
Man in society is concerned with order and freedom and
it has been his unfortunate lot that a stable equilibrium of the two
has never continued for long. And in situations of instability, be-
cause it may appear that order must be prior to freedom, it often
Q
has been exalted as the sine qua non of civilization. The reverse
has been argued too, and a surprising amount of Jacobin optimism
9
still exists in liberal Western politics and in their bodies politic.
But one must be cautious in translating a form of philosophical
Q
The primacy of order is an argument put forth by most
autocratic regimes. For example, the military takeover of the
Brazilian government in 1964, as well as those which subsequently
took place in Peru, Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic;
it has been the basis in South Vietnam for the exclusion of many
non-Viet Cong critics from participation in government.
9
It was this sort of optimism which brought pressure on
the U. S. government to withdraw support from the Diem regime
in 1963; in the late 1960's in the United States, it was in part an
optimistic belief in the primacy of freedom that led to rejection of
institutions of order by certain student groups.
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truth into the political idiom. If order and freedom are inter-
dependent it does not necessarily follow that all operative
expressions of order and freedom within a political community
are recognizable or detectable. In other words, the consequences
of order -dominant and freedom -dominant interests may be felt
without recognition of the interests themselves. For example,
insistence on order as a prior condition to freedom may succeed
without it becoming apparent that freedom in a sense meaningful
to the members of that community is in fact existent. In this
case, the great danger would seem to be in pursuing order to the
point where existing freedoms are erased in the process. Of
course, the example might be turned around, as essentially
happened in the French and Bolshevik Revolutions.
In sum, priority between order and freedom --as between
unity and diversity -- does not exist. But in the world of politics
an experienced and sensitive perception is needed in order to
pierce the veil of illusion and detect those expressions whose
effects may be felt without being seen, thus giving the appearance
that order or freedom -- usually order -- is indeed a prerequisite. 10
10 For example, the customs and traditions of many European
states provide a considerable basis for self-imposed order even in
the absence of government institutions --a fact which accounts in
part for the rapid economic recovery of Europe following World War
II. Likewise, the instinct for order inherent in Jewish society has
been a major factor in the rapid integration of Jews from all over




The analytical unit of human nature used herein is embraced
in the term interests. It is a term descriptive of the consequences
of human nature. It is broadly conceived so as to include any
humanly felt or expressed need, thought, value, or action whether
it be rational or irrational, spontaneous or deliberate, material
of spiritual. An interest may be as simple as what one thinks his
interest is irrespective of whether its pursuit may be objectively
harmful to the pursuer or conducive to his welfare. Or interests
may be revealed through the consequences of day-to-day actions.
The term, in brief, is intended to be as broad as is necessary to
reflect a human nature that is thought to be infinitely complex.
The term does not imply what man's interests should be.
Rather it identifies the consequences of human nature as the
material which, when unordered, may lead to conflict and when
harmonized may lead to value satisfaction. Hence the desirability
that they should be expressed within a framework of order.
Interest identification is obviously an inexact process and
one which can only be partially successful at best. But assuming
that the more important an interest is to an individual the more
effort he will make to communicate it, there is reason to suppose
that a considerable knowledge about human interests is available
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to those who seek them out. Thus, schematically, man's nature
is looked on as a "black box" into which a stimulus is fed and out
of which comes an interest. While judgments as to his "true"
nature, value preferences, and capacity to reason may indeed be
based on the interests he reveals, it would be a gross mistake to
conclude that the judgments are more than oversimplifications of
an infinitely complex cause -effect process which at best can be
understood only partially.
Interests are then the manifestations of man's individuality.
Also, they account for -- but do not describe -- the process by
which man has transformed himself from an individual to a social
unit. This process is the crux of the community formation phe-
nomenon which is herein thought of as the cons equence- revealed
purpose of human existence.
Democracy
In the realm of domestic politics democracy is a term made
meaningful by its association with mechanistic concepts -- unre-
stricted adult suffrage, majority rule, representative government,
two political parties, church-state separation, checks and balances,
etc. These concepts have their place in a society which considers
See the discussion of 'human nature" in the preface
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itself sovereign and is ever seeking to find effective methods of
expressing its "general will. " However, they tend to obscure the
truth that democracy is only effective insofar as a general will,
in the sense that Rousseau intended, exists to be expressed. In
its absence, so-called democratic institutions simply register
particular wills, or at best a "will of all, " which is their
12summation. To nurture, communicate, and express a general
will is the meaning of democracy, as herein employed.
In practice then, it follows that democracy is a goal never
to be completely, or even closely realized. It is nonetheless,
hopefully, what Stanley Hoffmann would regard as a "relevant
13
Utopia" --it may be enough if the actual results of majority rule
keep individual frustration and dissatisfaction at low enough levels
so that the organization of society is not itself threatened.
Thus, the deeper meaning of democracy is that it is an
expression of the degree of the social relationship between the
individual and the community of which he is a part -- in other
words an expression of the degree of social integration present.
12
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If there is social integration, or to the degree that it exists,
the community possesses the potential for a political democracy
which can relate the individual to government in terms of his
interests, thereby establishing the basis for organic action by
society (as opposed to action through an individual, or individuals,
14
who might merely control or manipulate society. )
Although the writer employs Rousseau's idea of a general
will, together with his distinction between society and government,
the basis of the general will is different. It is still the general
will of society, or of the community, and not some Hegelian
manifestation of national interest. However, rather than being
founded on the basis of a supposed natural virtue or of the
goodness in mankind and being threatened by particular wills, it
is thought of as synonymous with John Dewey's concept of the
15
public interest -- an interest that arises as the consequences
of interests privately pursued extend beyond the group immediately
engaged. Thus, the greater the number of private interests, the
more likely the generation of a public interest (as a result of
Relating the individual to government has little intrinsic
value if there is little social development. In such cases, the more
representative a government, the more likely it will be arbitrary
and unstable precisely because the society itself is unstable.
1 5 Dewey, loc . cit.
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conflicting interests );the greater the extent of a private interest,
the more likely its consequences will affect others and thereby
generate a public interest. A multiplicity of private interests
tends to link the individuals of a society together by unseen bonds
that account for the numerous sub-societies or smaller communi-
ties operating within the more extensive one. Dewey's requirement
for "face-to-face communication" is the absolute essential for
creating a community -wide awareness of the private interests
of all its members and thus the ability to perceive, understand,
and accept the public interest. Like democracy itself, the goal
of total communication is merely a relevant Utopia; it is enough
if the degree of non-communication is not so large as to incapaci-
tate government, or, in the extreme, to destroy its necessary
social base
.
In summary, democracy has five essentials:
Again, note the contrast with Rousseau: Because particu-
lar wills threatened the general will and "the general will was
always right" -- and therefore "good" -- larger communities
represented an inherent threat to the general will because they had
more particular wills. The relationship herein discussed ascribes
no independent virtue to the general will (public interests); rather
its value is related to its function in harmonizing private interests
-- i.e., particular wills. More private interests may make the
task of legislation and government more complex but at the same
time they make life more meaningful. Watkins, loc. cit.
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First, a group of individuals linked together by a multi-
plicity of private interests.
Second, an awareness on the part of the group members of
17
each other's interests and their extent;
Third, the ability of the group members to see themselves
as constituting a larger community, a society having a public
interest generated as the consequence of pursuing private
interests;
Fourth, the political institutions for expressing the general
will, or public interest, in a manner appropriate to practical
requirements; and
Fifth, a "feedback" system for stimulating the pursuit of
private interests, thereby keeping the entire process vital.
That order and freedom are deeply entwined in the pursuit
of interests is a part of democracy's definition that will emerge
in Chapter III with discussion of the role of interests in society.
Obviously such perceptions are always imperfect. None-
theless, they are of crucial importance to democratic government
since without such knowledge there is no basis for evaluating one's
own narrow interests as opposed to those of the community.

CHAPTER IK
THE ROLE OF INTERESTS IN SOCIETY
I. INTRODUCTION
Essentially the community theory argument is a simple one.
Stimuli, whether external to man or within him, are treated by a
unique human nature to produce an individual's interests. At any
one instant these interests have a hierarchical relationship to one
another. The interests in turn are compared with those of others
and it is discovered that some are common, some conflicting
while some appear to be neither. In pursuing common interests
jointly it then becomes apparent that broader capabilities are
created for the individual, thus furnishing a rationale for main-
taining a common, or social, arrangement. This rationale,
which is termed sense of community
,
is why conflicting indivi-
dual interests are often deferred to broader social considerations.
The term "sense of community" is taken from Richard
W. Van Wagenen, Research in the International Organization Field:
Some Notes on a Possible Focus (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University, 195Z), p. 11. As used by Van Wagenen, the term is
defined as "...a feeling on the part of an individual or individuals
inhabiting a given territory that consensus has been attained to the
effect that common social problems must and can be resolved or
adjusted by processes of peaceful change. "
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When sense of community is strong enough to achieve this deference
to public or community interest and when institutions, formal or
informal, are devised to aid in the process it is further said that
2
a community exists. Finally, if the community becomes so
extensive as to be an all-inclusive society and if it adopts institu-
tions which allow it to express itself both externally and internally,
it is a political community.
Stated in another way the argument is more explicit. As an
individual, man's interests may be classified in two categories:
survival -dominant interests which reflect the desire to maintain
life itself (his); and satisfaction-dominant interests which reflect
a broader concern. Thus, what common interest pursuit does is
to share the burden of some of the more onerous and demanding
requirements for insuring survival and elemental satisfaction,
thereby increasing an individual's interest capability. Other
survival -dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests remain
outside the framework of common effort but those that are so
joined are termed public interests and become a new dichotomy:
See footnote 2, Chapter II. When Rousseau distinguished
between the general will and the will of all he thought of the two
as "mutually incompatible ends." Deference to the public interest
is, then, similar to operation of the general will.
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order -dominant interests which reflect a concern for the pre-
servation of the joint effort; and freedom -dominant interests
which reflect a concern of the individual to maintain his indi-
viduality. This new dichotomy of order-dominant and freedom-
dominant interests characterizes what is termed civil-society;
the former dichotomy in which interests are merely survival
-
dominant or satisfaction dominant concerns individual interests
and is the hypothetical state of nature. Public interests, then,
can be thought of as interests derived as a consequence of pur-
suing individual interests within a common, or social, framework,
3
or, in other words, within a community. Thus public interests
and common interests are directly related in an ideal community;
and with ideal communications a general, or common, will can be
4
assumed to emerge; common interests are then viewed in the
As described by John Dewey. See John Dewey, The Public
and its Problems (Denver: Allan Swallow) (Original edition by
Henry Holt h Co., 1927), pp. 12-22.
The validity of both Rousseau's and Aristotle's emphasis
on communities limited in size is supported by the above argument
when one takes into account the limited efficiency of communi-
cations which they foresaw. Thus, a general will was conceived
to be a local phenomenon by Rousseau, and Aristotle thought of his
ideal state as having a population somewhere between 10,000 and
100,000. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract" in
William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (N. Y. : Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1961) p. 457; and Karl W. Keutsch, Political
Community at the International Level (N. Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1954
p. 5. Also, see footnote 10, Chapter II.
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context of the overall sense of community. Actually, of course,
all of man's interests are not so viewed: the state of civil-society
is everywhere incomplete and even if it were not, the ability to
communicate individual interests and so to find common interests
is imperfectly developed.
The foregoing hypothetical sketch illustrates the essential
community formation phenomenon. Two final considerations,
however, indicate the extent to which the phenomenon, although
essentially a natural one, is non-deterministic. First, simul-
taneously with the development of a political community other
communities are developing with which it is not in communication.
Thus each such isolated community is not unlike the hypothetical
man in the state of nature: it -- the community, not its people --
develops survival -dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests
which pertain to the community as a personality rather than as
a group expression of individuals. Thus it is a paradox that the
unifying process of community development is also intrinsically
divisive, for the interests and institutions which bind one community
together are as likely to separate it from other communities . Only
by developing inter -community communications and common
interests between the people of the various communities can a
more inclusive sense of community be developed.
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The second consideration is the element of reality that
has hitherto been missing in the argument: some political
entities, or nation-states as they now are called, are not the
end result of a community -formation process. Instead they
are simply large groups of people over whom a government
has been instituted that bears no direct ins titutional relation-
ship to them. Nor, in such cases, is there a single common
society developed to the point where it could express a general
will. India appears to be a multi -society state, for example,
and many of the new African states find society only at the
tribal level.
The argument will now be examined in detail.
II. INTERESTS, SENSE OF COMMUNIT Y, AND COMMUNITY
Man's interests do not exist independently of his existence,
although there are objective forces which act on him, which
5
While every large society is composed of numerous groups
which loosely can be referred to as communities -- i.e., the
religious, professional, business, ethnic groups -- the developed
or integrated society has a larger frame of interests in sufficient
number and of such quality as to substantially diminish what would
otherwise be the divisive effects of the smaller groups. For ex-
ample, the United States is obviously highly integrated even though
it has several minority groups which are not; the Congo (K), on the
other hand, does not have a matrix of interests capable of overriding
the more meaningful interests of tribe and geographic region.
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stimulate and help to shape his value system, his reason, his
nature, and which therefore are responsible in part for his
interests. These might be the result of other men's actions or
they might be the product of nature. In any event, they constitute
what is called the human environment. Perhaps, too, subjective
stimulants whose effects are felt but whose existence can only
be conjectured also exist. A historical force or a universal
will are possible examples. Additionally, man has the capacity
for auto -stimulation.
But irrespective of the sources of the various stimuli,
interests themselves can be created only through an interaction
of stimuli and that mysterious unknown quantity which is human
nature and which is apparently unique to each individual. Interests,
therefore, are inherently personal however similar they may
appear to be. The exact character of an individual's self may
provoke inspired theories -- such as those of Freud -- but in the
end the search cannot lead to definitive findings. Thus, human
nature cannot be precisely explained because neither the stimuli
can be effectively isolated nor can the interests be accurately
identified.
Because interests are personal creations, the idea of ob-
jective interests is a correct concept only if it is understood as
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being in the realm of "oughts. " To say that so-called objective
interests are other than "oughts" is to deny to man a category of
real interests as human as the capacity to err: to wit, his
irrational interests. His welfare may be endangered by his
ignoring of what someone else might choose to call objective in-
terests but this is a course everyone chooses at one time or
another. For example, public interests -- which will be dis-
cussed at a later point -- may be regarded as in every citizen's
individual interest yet many individuals dissent in specific
instances
.
It is implicit in the foregoing that an interest, besides
being uniquely personal, must be perceived by the owner in
order to exist; if it is beyond the threshold of perceptibility it
does not exist. For example, values which an individual claims
are in the realm of interests; values which he does not claim
but which nevertheless are evidenced by his conduct are assumed
to be a part of his nature -- his internal value structure. Hence
they are not interests. Since the human environment is obviously
a source of constant stimulation, it is assumed that in addition
to helping to create individual interests it is also constantly causing
an individual's nature to change.
Because they are perceptible, an individual may class
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and characterize his interests; he may also weigh them to deter-
mine their instantaneous importance to him. Thus although the
manner in which they develop in his mind and find conscious
expression is an inexplicable process, the consequences of the
process are evident to the individual. Moreover, some of an
individual's interests are evident to others and accordingly take
on the character of stimuli so far as others are concerned. In
other words, as individual interests multiply they also, in
varying degrees, overlap, interact, and become interdependent
the one on the other. This is a development which engages the
attention of all men.
Some of the more obvious interests of others are evident
in their actions and conduct; still more about their interests is
revealed through more personal methods of communication --
such as conversation and discourse. As a result, individuals
can detect many situations in which it may occur to them that
their interests are in harmony with those of others. If this
leads to a feeling that joint pursuit of such interests is of greater
mutual benefit than the sacrifices it entails, then a sense of
community is said to exist. Thus common interests are the
visible manifestations of sense of community.
Pursuit of individual interests within a community, whether
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conducted singly or jointly, is bound to bring about conflicts of
interests too. This occurs when the consequences of such pur-
suits extend beyond the group immediately concerned, an
occurence which generates a public interest directed towards the
amelioration of the effects of uncontrolled pursuit. Public interests
are the true test of sense of community; for although sense of
community is created by recognition of common interests, it is
maintained by deferring conflicting common interests to public
interests. This act of recognizing the value of sense of community
by deferring to public interests is the act which transforms a
group having a sense of community into a community. And just
as common interests are the visible manifestations of sense of
community, so the institutions, formal or informal, for detecting
the public interest and ensuring its effective execution are the
visible manifestations of community. It might be noted that if
there were no conflicting interests and no threats from outside
the community, there would be no need for community institu-
tions: sense of community would be a sufficient framework for
the pursuit of individual and common interests.
Not that this would be an ideal community. Community in-
stitutions, such as schools and public services, actually play a
vital role in the integrative process apart from reconciling con-
flicting interests or organizing community security. See Philip E.
Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process" in Philip E.
Jacob and James V. Toscano (editors), The Integration of Politic?!




The foregoing argument also can be made by another
approach which involves the classification of interests. For
argumentative purposes, it is assumed that a state of nature
existed prior to that of civil society -- although it seems
probable, as Rousseau argued, that such a state never did in
reality exist. It is enough, however, to think of it as the point
or origin from which social man has traced his steps to the
present. Whether or not it actually existed is irrelevant.
The point is that neither does the state of civil society exist,
except as a goal towards which man is directing himself.
Thus, if civil society is incompletely realized, man must be
somewhere between the state of nature and his social goal.
Also, those characteristics of man in the state of nature which
might be logically inferred are still operative, along with
those which pertain to the state of civil society.
In theory, civil society implies a single society embrac-
ing all of mankind; until this is a reality man must recognize
that the respective members of different societies are extra-




saying in the state of nature. Therefore, civil society and
the state of nature are the two limiting forms which mark,
respectively, the outer limits of complete community integra-
tion and of the completely individual human.
Superfically, it appears that it is not man who is incom-
pletely integrated but the several communities into which he is
divided. However, a moment's reflection is remindful of the fact
that communities do not have the ability to feel emotion, to trust,
to recognize common or public interests. Men do these things
and the fact that sometimes their actions are official, some-
times private cannot change the personal nature of their origin.
Man is a social creature; but also he is often on his own. Any
thorough understanding of the foundations of society must take
into consideration the incompleteness which is characteristic of
any civil society.
To take into account man's conduct as a non-social unit,
his interests are divided into two classifications: his survival
-
7
In essence only, of course, since actually there is a
web of interests that binds various people of different countries
together in varying degrees. However, it is far more valid to
think of, for example, American society and Iranian society as
extra-social with respect to each other than as part of a larger
society. With respect to other societies the same would be true
although the degree of extra-sociality would differ. The United
States and Great Britain, for example.
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dominant interests, which reflect his unilateral battle merely to
stay alive; and his satis faction -dominant interests, which reflect
his individual need to find purpose in existence -- whether it be
to satisfy appetite or taste, to find beauty or aesthetic enjoyment,
or to know spiritual contentment. Irrationality for such an isolated
man would consist of deferring to a satisfaction-dominant interest
in the face of a threat to his survival.
It seems reasonable, however, to suppose that man has
transferred to civil societies -- to the extent that they exist --
much of his concern for sheer survival and a considerable
responsibility for providing satisfaction. The more developed
the society the more that this is likely to be true. But, at the
same time, in becoming a member of civil-society man acquires
a new classification of interests. No longer is he directly con-
cerned with survival and satisfaction; these are taken for granted.
His social concern is primarily with the means by which survival
and satisfaction are brought about and with his relationship to
that means. Thus, in society, man's interests are classified in
a new dichotomy: his order-dominant interests are those reflecting
his concern for the welfare of ,his community or society; his




In sum, because society is incomplete, because no man
claims to know perfectly his neighbor, because communication
is an imperfect art retarding development of common interests,
interests can be described as having a four-fold classification:
(a) Man as a non-social unit in the state of nature:
(1) survival -dominant interests, and
(Z) satisfaction-dominant interests;
(b) Man as a member of civil society:
(1) order -dominant interests and
(2) freedom -dominant inte rests .
Thus the community -formation process -- individual
interests to sense of community to community -- is seen to
be a process impelled by the character of man's interests.
Civil society and community are one and the same and both are
illustrative goals rather than definitive expressions of reality.
More importantly, both reflect a universal purpose of man --
the pursuit of unity in diversity.
The community -formation process is continuously at
work but, lacking a strong enough universal sense of community,
the process is much like building sand castles by the sea: the
passage of time erases communities the same as it allows them
to be built. Business communities, professional communities,
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religious communities, cultural communities, racial communi-
ties, educational communities, residential communities,
scientific communities, family communities, security communi-
ties, and of course, political communities are only a few
examples of the social diversity which is a product of pursuing
individual interests. There are, perhaps, as many kinds of
common interests as individual interests and these can lead to
larger communities. The more highly developed and integrated
is the larger community, the greater the likelihood that its
members will generate more common interests. This is so
because social development increases the needs of the community.
In the same way, the potential for conflict within the community
increases with an increase in individual interest. This, too, can
result in a realization of common interest. Accordingly, a need
for a larger sense of community develops.
IV. COMMUNITY, SOCIETY, AND GOVERNMENT
It is obvious that if communities are as diverse as the examples
just cited, there is a probability of conflict not only between different
communities of similar composition but also between communities
of different types. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that
most individuals are members of more than one community --in
fact, it is theoretically possible for them to be members of as

47.
many as those in which their diverse interests are in common
with others. Since this can link one community to another through
a degree of common membership, a larger sense of community
can be developed.
Thus, just as the basis for the most basic or elemental
community derives from common interests and a desire to main-
tain an advantageous sense of community in the face of conflicting
interests, so the fact of individual participation in multiple com-
munities tends to create a wider sense of community in the manner
of an "interlocking directorate, " or matrix. The development is
horizontal in that the individual simply belongs to more communi-
ties; but it is also vertical in that the individual begins to realize
a higher sense of community in his concern for the preservation
of the entire framework within which the smaller communities
thrive. Note that the larger sense of community is not the result
of pyramiding smaller communities; individuals and not communi-
ties are the basis for this larger development.'
The end result of the vertical development is what is thought
of today as the national society. For the future, man can take as
his goal a universal society, although such is not a reasonable
current goal. The term "society" is used to describe the greater
community which embraces all of the lesser communities created
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by a given national grouping. As it is known today society is
typically an evolutionary product of centuries of human inter-
course. Where intercourse between members has been restricted
-- whether by tyrannical rule, by poverty of resources, or by
natural impediments -- the integration of that society is
restricted. That is, there are fewer interests applicable to
fewer individuals over a smaller radius of effectiveness. Where
intercourse has not been restricted, the development is decidedly
more pluralistic (more interests), though not necessarily charac-
terized by strong sense of community. Similarly, the mere
existence of multiple interests does not guarantee a strong
society (as will be seen in Chapter IV).
The strength of a society is measured in terms of its
ability to identify efficiently its public -inte rests which is in turn
dependent on the society's capacity for internal communication.
Because internal communication is a necessary means of dis-
covering common interests it is one of the characteristics of a
society having a highly developed sense of community. However,
it should be noted that the most prominent requirement of a
strong political community -- the ability to take effective action
-- is of less importance to a society than to a government because,
in the presence of a well-developed sense of community, public
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interests take on the character of a general will, thereby gaining
a degree of acceptance which, in theory, requires less adminis-
o
trative and executive power.
As used in practice, the term national society usually in-
volves an unwarranted premise that a particular society is coex-
tensive with the geographic borders and political control of the
nation-state. But every nation-state does not have a national
society: some have several large ethnic groupings, some appear
to be mere collections of people, and still others have societies
q
which are very poorly developed. Thus is exposed the crux
of the problem of developing democratic nation-states -- that is,
the degree to which a national society exists or can be created
which can support stable democratic self-government. Without
Q
This is not to argue, as did Rousseau, that the general
will is always right, nor that consensus is necessarily coercive.
The argument is that an awareness of individual interests not only
facilitates identification of public interests but encourages accep-
tance of them. This phenomenon of the integrative process is dis-
cussed in the context of "popular acceptance" by Karl W. Deutsch
in "Communication Theory and Political Integration, " pp. 46-74,
Jacob and Toscano (editors), op. cit .
q
The USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and the
USA are examples of nation-states with more than one unintegrated
social grouping; the Congo (K) is an example of a tribal collection;




such a society, democratic government is like an engine without
a fly-wheel, lacking the inertia necessary to stability. There is
no force to maintain continuity between past, present, and future.
Thus, with an imperfectly developed national society the potential
for stable democratic government is correspondingly reduced
since the institutions of representative government ensure that
the imperfections of society will be reflected.
In Chapter IV it will be seen that there is a basis for com-
paring national societies to a democratic norm that proportions
interests by type (order -dominant or freedom-dominant), by
number, and by consensus. In the meantime, a highly developed,
integrated society will be considered to be synonymous with a
democratic society.
If society is described as having .the means of detecting the
public interest and as having the institutions, formal or informal,
for translating this into effective action, what is the purpose of
government ?
Government is made necessary by two facts: (1) that
society cannot approach theoretical perfection even within nation-
states; and (2) that within the .international system there actually




exist numerous societies --in varying stages of development --
which are not part of a greater universal society in any meaning-
ful sense and which therefore must be competent to deal with
one another. For example, France and Germany exist side by
side, but despite NATO and the Common Market the two national
societies are not in any meaningful way part of a larger society;
governments are necessary to manage relations between the two
societies as well as to harmonize conflicting interests of their
own citizens
.
Ideally, government should be nothing more than the
institutional arrangement necessary to gloss over the inevitable
deficiencies within society --a requirement that has always
existed and will continue to exist. It should look inward to its
people only and be responsive to people and not to society in a
corporate sense. Of course, government is nothing of the sort.
Of necessity it looks outward as well as inward and usually con-
siders itself responsible to society as a whole rather than to
people.
To sum up, there is no society so completely developed,
or integrated, that it can be said to possess a Rousseau-type
general will. Furthermore a glance at the national societies
underlying nation-states confirms that there are vast differences
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in the degree of social integration of the various states. It
is not even clear where a large community ends and a small or
incomplete society begins. It is only clear that, in terms of
"oughts, " a nation-state which hopes to be a self-governing
democracy ought to have a single, integrated national society
which is capable of discerning its public interests. Lacking
this social foundation self-government at best is unstable, at
worst a means of transition from one degree of anarchy or
tyranny to another.
The number of non -representative governments in the
world is a fact that should not idly be deplored for the govern-
ments are not altogether blameworthy. The objective requirement
for government of some sort is generally recognized. However,
if there is no social foundation capable, of supporting self-govern-
ment this is a fact which should be considered in the light of the
potential for constructing one. The materials might not be so
readily at hand. Of more relevance is whether such governments
are attempting to develop their societies or merely taking advantage
For example: India with its multiple societies; Vietnam
with its urban -rural dichotomy; Belgium with its Flemish-Walloon
dispute; Cyprus with citizens of both Greek and Turkish origin;
Nigeria or the Congo with tribal emphasis; with some exceptions,
the rich-poor breakdown of most South American countries; the
United States with its racial minorities; or the USSR with uninte-




Government leaders can -- and some do - - attempt to build
national societies on a short range basis employing whatever
means their ingenuities can devise -- the foreign bogey, indus-
trialization, nationalism, etc. They can also assume, in the
manner of Hobbes, that government and society are the same
things; thus whether or not the government is institutionally
related to the people it nonetheless asserts the right to speak as
the voice of the people. This latter misconception is not far
removed, if at all, from the Hegelian state in which the state
in effect rejects society as a valid authority in favor of a meta-
physical national spirit which transcends in importance the
people.
There is no deterministic path from individual interest to
sense of community to community to society nor from society
to either government or self-government. Mechanistic institutions
of democracy can give self expression to the people but they are
not adequate to relate individuals to one another in society. Yet
it is society which, in perceiving public interests, makes govern-
ment necessary. Without society the interests of government
would tend to be national interests a la Hegel rather than the
interests of the people. The interests of the people which would
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be represented by a representative government of an inchoate
society would at best be common interests of a transient majority,
out of date the day after an election. On the other hand, well
developed society can give continuity, purpose, and stability
to government by linking together its members with the strongest
band of all --common interests. That the end result of multiple
democratic nation-states is inevitable conflict between themselves
is simply convincing evidence that international democracy is no
more a panacea for international strife and conflict than totali-
12
tarianism. It is as wrong to assume a condition of natural
harmony between democratic nation-states as to assume one be-
tween socialist states. In either case the various national
societies would be extra-social with respect to one another;
ultimate harmony would be totally dependent on development of a
common society and a government coextensive to it.
12
Conflict (not necessarily war or violent conflict) is inevi-
table because the interests of states overlap. For example, the
Saar Basin was of economic value to both France and Germany;
choice fishing areas are limited in number and location, yet
nations which have a major interest in fisheries are often neighbors
competing for the same fish; and pursuit of raw materials and trade
markets leads to continuous competition. Thus interests of states
are not naturally harmonious. See the excellent discussion of atti-
tudes reference natural harmony in Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The




V. ELEMENTS OF THE INTEREST ARGUMENT
The central argument of the community theory is that human
nature begets interests which lead to sense of community. Certain
aspects of the process, the first of which is matrix formation,
need further elaboration.
Matrix Formation
It is simple to conceive of a series of common interests, all
different, acting as links between individuals until every member
of a group is so joined. However, in this case there would be
no single interest common to every member or even to nearly all
of them. It is not conceivable that such a chain -linked group
could develop a significant sense of community unless we were
talking about the same interests. Thus, despite the fact that
common interests are the essential element of sense of community,
there is more to be explained.
First, it should be noted that a chain-linked group has a
precarious future: a change in a few interests can break the chain.
Since this is less likely if there is more than one chain of interests,
it is reasonable to expect a higher degree of permanence for a
group, each member of which has multiple common interests.
Actually, most common interests embrace a number of
individuals. Thus the second point to be noted is that the greater
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the/number of members sharing a common interest, the stronger
the sense of community vis a vis those members, and the less
the likelihood that the chain will be broken. This is because each
link of the chain, or interest, is composed not of one person but
of many. And the more people holding an interest, the stronger
the link. In sum, the breadth of sense of community is determined
by the number of members linked by common interests; permanence
and stability are a function of the number of common interests
which link them; and strength is related to the number of indivi-
13duals having the same common interests.
It is implicit that interests common to all the members of
a group are more effective in establishing a sense of community,
a judgment borne out by the record of such time -tested interests
as nationalism, national security, and-a common religion. While
it is possible for an individual to realize that he is interdependent
in a larger sense because of his numerous narrower interests, it
" It should be noted that the strength of sense of community
is seen to be directly related to consensus and that no account is
taken of variations in the degree, or intensity, of preference. This
is because intensity of preference is not in itself a relevant variable.
Instead it operates to influence the number of interests a person
might have. For example, with respect to interests "W", "X", "Y",
and "Z", a very intense feeling for one interest, say interest "W",
in preference to interests "X", "Y", an* "Z" would, in effect, elimi-
nate that person from the consensus of each of those interests.
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is more likely that actual sense of community is a result of
community -wide interests. The smaller communities of which
an individual is a member simply act to reinforce the larger
ones, which are probably less personal and immediate, but
which, nonetheless, link individuals in the same way.
To evaluate the sense of community of a group it is neces-
sary: (1) to identify the group's public and significant common
interests; (2) to measure the community consensus in support
of each interest; (3) to classify the interests as order -dominant or
as freedom-dominant; (4) to evaluate their importance to the
group (using as a criterion the percent of the group each affects);
and (5) to compare the two classifications as to relative number
of interests, as to degree of supporting consensus, and as to
14density of interests of high group importance. The chain-link
effect is most important, but extremely difficult to measure (the
method proposed in Chapter IV is to measure the number of
identical persons in the supporting consensus -of any two interests
which are ranked next to each other; however, in the absence of
empirical data it would probably be necessary to rely on the
How the above might be accomplished practically is of
less importance than the theoretical possibility of doing so. The
section in Chapter IV entitled "Description" discusses in general
terms a possible approach.
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judgment of a person who is a student of that group or society.).
In any event, the value of the matrix study comes with
the realization that the term is theoretically quantifiable. In-
stead of being treated as a lump quantity, it is in fact susceptible
of being broken down into the relationship of numbers of identi-
fiable interests and particular individuals.
Interests
Individual interests have been classified, according to
whether man is in or out of society, in dichotomies that reflect
the consequences of his nature. Other classifications would have
been possible: concrete or abstract; inner-directed or other-
directed; rational or irrational; material or spiritual. But, they
are not pertinent to the argument and, since they do not interfere
with its development, have been disregarded.
There are other qualifications to interests, however, which
cannot be disregarded. When does a private interest, common or
individual, become public ? Can public interests be derived except
from within society? What is the relationship of public interests
to national interests ? Is the distinction meaningful?
In Chapter II, reference was made to John Dewey's concept
of the public interest -- a private interest whose consequences
extend beyond the group pursuing it. This concept is the definition
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used herein. It takes note of the fact that an interest is not neces-
sarily public because of the number of persons engaged in it:
they can be many or few. The essential condition is one of un-
controlled side -effect. Obviously, there is no implication that the
occasion of a public interest requires that the private interests
generating it be liquidated simply because a small number of
people are responsible for it. The effect on the public may be
entirely beneficial, requiring no act of government to control it.
It may be productive of more private interests. Or, of course, it
may require positive measures to achieve harmony.
Nor is it necessary that private interests arise only from
private initiative: it is a valid public interest to stimulate the
creation of private interests which might, as a consequence,
generate more public interests. But one criterion always pertains:
a public interest is inward looking and in the interest of the public
as individuals -- a distinction which separates it from national
interests .
National interests, on the other hand, are inherently
Hegelian. They pertain to the welfare of the state as a corporate
creature having a right of existence which is superior to the
rights of any of its citizens. Such interests, however deplored,
exist unavoidably as a result of the nation-state or international
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system. Sovereign equality is supported by an international law
which recognizes no rights of private individuals. Not only do
nation-states have the right of existence and to take measures
to maintain that existence, they also pursue a style of existence.
Like individuals, they seek power, wealth, prestige, and
security. But it is the form itself -- the nation-state --to whom
these satisfactions are supposed to accrue and not necessarily
to its citizens. This is more true of some nation-states than of
others; but no nation-state today is without a share of national
interests .
National interests can be understood by referring back to
the interest classifications used to describe man's actions in the
state of nature. That is, nation-states are like supe r -individuals ;
they pretend to have personalities, complex "human" natures, the
capacity for rational or irrational action, emotional feelings, etc.
Moreover they confront one another in a hostile environment that
both threatens their security and restricts their efforts at self-
satisfaction. Under these conditions, nation-states' interests may
be classified as survival-dominant or satisfaction-dominant.
But nation-states, as well as earlier forms, have always
had to deal with one another to some degree and in this respect
one can consider the international community analogous to a

61.
primitive people community. It is obviously poorly integrated
15but neither is it in the state of nature. Nation-states, there-
fore, comprise, in the least, an inchoate society. And, because
of this partial social situation, some of their interests may be
classified as order-dominant or freedom-dominant.
Assuming that the international system really is analogous
to a people community, it would seem to face the same major
problem: how to expand and integrate the community in order to
make it more complete and to reduce the number and importance
of national interests classified as survival or satisfaction-dominant.
In a later chapter the difficulties a states -community has on this
point will be examined further.
Order and Freedom
Order and freedom are concepts widely used to convey ideas
that are generally regarded as universal in their applicability. But,
15
The states have numerous private interests, many of which
are in common. In many cases these common interests have been
recognized and institutions developed to ensure their harmonization.
For example, a mutual concern for the safety of ships at sea has led
to a convention on the law of the sea. And the specialized Agencies of
the United Nations represent another type of institution for the protec-
tion of certain mutual interests. For a fascinating contemplation of the
inchoate nature of the international system, as well as of states within
the system, see Fred W . Riggs, "The Nation-State and Other Actors"
in James N. Rosenau (editor) International Politics and Foreign Policy
(revised; New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 90-92.
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because definitions of them are so lacking in precision, there is
considerable disagreement as to what the concepts mean. For
example, are they direct opposites ? Is freedom the absence of
restraint, order the application of restraint? If what is regarded
as order and freedom are in fact external evidence of two inner
forces of man's nature, as is the writer's belief, can they be
realized except in terms of interests ?
The last question exposes a major point about order and
freedom in society; namely that although one can think of society
as the result of a basic need of the individual to balance order and
freedom, this can be accomplished only through the medium of
interest pursuit. Thus, not only can interests be classified as
order -dominant or freedom -dominant, but, of greater importance,
order and freedom cannot be regarded as meaningful to society
except in terms of interests. It is the concepts of order and
freedom which are antithetical; but interests -- although classified
as order or freedom -dominant -- can, if diverse enough, allow
simultaneous pursuit of both categories.
Obviously, therefore, order and freedom are relative to
capability -- the capability to. pursue order -dominant or freedom
-
dominant interests. And to speak of man as by nature free is no
more meaningful than to say that by nature he has certain capabilities
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relative to his environment. In fact, such capabilities are essen-
tially animal in character, the abilities to think and to communi-
cate being a product of social experience. To maintain that
social man is basically free seems more of an affirmation of a
capacity for irrationality -- the freedom to pursue interests whose
effects are contrary to one's own interests.
Thus, order and freedom have exact definitions when used
in the community theory argument. Order is the necessary regu-
lation a society imposes on itself in order to facilitate interest
pursuit; freedom is the capability to pursue interests. Both can
be quantified in a rough sense by identifying, enumerating, and
classifying specific interests. A highly developed and sophisticated
society is expected to have a greater capacity for the pursuit of
both order and freedom than a lesser developed society. A
pluralistic society seems to indicate much freedom, but this may
not be so if private interests are so poorly regulated as to interfere
with one another; and a traditional society under an autocratic
regime might have a relatively large amount of freedom if its
citizens are not restrained from pursuing all the interests they are
capable of pursuing. Likewise there may be far less order in a
Cf. Riggs, loc. cit.
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totalitarian regime than would appear to exist if there are few
interests requiring regulation. Finally, order in some communi-
ties may be extremely high with almost no evidence of government
regulation if the community is so highly integrated that most
17individual interests are communicated to most members.
Tyranny and anarchy which are often related to order
and freedom, respectively, actually have the opposite relationship:
tyranny is the absence of freedom, not the presence of total order;
anarchy is the absence of order rather than the presence of total
freedom. And since order and freedom are manifested in terms of
interests, anarchy and tyranny are the absence of such interests.
Order and freedom are characteristics of society; anarchy and
tyranny are characteristics of groups which are not socially
developed and have no communal matrjix. Therefore, it is apparent
that just as order and freedom can be realized together, so can
anarchy and tyranny. An example would be a simple society
governed despotically. And, even though order and freedom are
17 A similar phenomenon is discussed by Watkins in connec-
tion with Rousseau's contention that primitive societies are superior
to more civilized societies: "Modern anthropologists know that the
rigid training to which people are subjected in many primitive com-
munities tends to produce a high degree of social integration. By
favoring the development of socially acceptable personality trans,
this training makes it possible for most individuals to accept their
traditional roles with a minimum of personal conflict. " Frederick
Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge : Harvard
University Press, 1957), p. 96.
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manifested in terms of interests, a society having a lot of
interests --of each type -- can still be both anarchic and
tyrannized since the desire to pursue interests is subject to
appetite. Anarchy and tyranny are, therefore, always present
in the degree to which a society is incompletely integrated.
Law and Liberty
In the real world, order and freedom require a more
tangible and responsive framework than that supplied by theo-
retical concepts. The concepts of law and liberty serve this
function. They comprise the attempt to institutionalize the rela-
tionship of individuals to government just as interest pursuit is the
means by which individuals institutionalize their relationship to
society. In neither case is the result foreordained.
Law and liberty are merely the more obvious means of
pursuing order and freedom. If they exist in a near vacuum of
individual interests they may in fact prove quite meaningless as a
means of achieving unity in diversity or order in freedom. For
law is generally aimed at regulating interests rather than creating
them and liberty is merely the absence of certain restraints; it is
not indicative of a capability to pursue interests.
Thus, while law is the backbone of order, it is an institution
incapable of producing order by itself; moreover, a society aware
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of its public interests and respectful of their priority is capable
of a high degree of self-imposed order. It is when the public
interest is not clearly perceived by the institutions of government
and thereafter communicated to society that the potential for self-
imposed order is reduced. For self-restraint cannot be exercised
when the requirement for it is not recognized.
Liberty is also an institution. It comprises those guaran-
tees, explicit or implicit, that individuals will be free from
certain restraints. It is constitutional to a particular society
and represents the minimum environment that society feels is
necessary for interest pursuit. Formsof liberty as well as law
1
8
are, of course, relative to a particular cultural environment.
Public Interests and National Survival
As stated, the community theory argument appears to be
saying that private interests arise only from individual initiative,
that public interests arise only as a reaction of internal forces
to private interests and the need to harmonize conflicting private
interests. But this is not the whole story. The stimulus that
produces the motivation to pursue a private interest can come from
The first ten amendments to the U. S. Constitution, the
Bill of Rights, is such a statement of liberties. Other societies
do not necessarily have the same list. For example, in the USSR
there is no private press, nor does the Soviet Constitution guaran
tee such a private right.
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any source including, most especially, a government. The
public interest can come about as a result of efforts by public
officials and elite groups to actively mold opinion and to lead the
public in discussion. And any group, public or private, which is
able to communicate effectively with a large portion of society
can undoubtedly play a significant role in developing public
interests .
However, aside from the above, the public interest has
another component deriving from the fact that the relationship of
one national society to another is essentially extra-social. As in
the fictional state -of-nature, societies confront one another and
appear to threaten not only each other's way of life but also each
other's survival. Their interests vis-a-vis one another are survival-
dominant or satisfaction-dominant. To survive and maintain its
social system is the first order of business of a society; its
internal interests -- be they order -dominant or freedom -dominant
-- cannot be allowed to interfere with such basic concerns. 7
These concerns are rather similar to what have previously
been referred to as national interests. At least they are generated
However, societies may change their form of government
to accommodate internal pressures. Such was the case in 1787
when the people of the United States, through their state governments,
discarded the Articles of Confederation in favor of a federal constitu-
tion. Likewise, in France the constitution of the Fourth Republic was
peaceably replaced by that of the Fifth Republic in 1958.
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in the same manner: in the first case by societies facing each
other as though they were in the state of nature and in the second
by nation-states facing each other in the international or states
system. But the difference is an important one. In a society
the individual is, by definition, related to the group; and public
interests are in his interest. But in the case of nation-states,
national interests have to do with the survival and well-being of
a form which may or may not bear an institutional relationship
to its citizens.
In either case however, the existence of a situation in which
societies and nation-states have survival -dominant and satisfaction-
dominant interests is indicative of an extra-social relationship.
It is this relationship that must be cured before concern for sur-
vival and satisfaction can be replaced by concern for order and free
20dom in the international community.
VI. THE RELEVANCE OF DEMOCRACY TO SOCIETY
The type of society which is the end product of the community
-
formation phenomenon is, by definition, democratic. That is, it is
This is not to argue the conclusions. Riggs discusses
two models for achieving harmony in relations between states,
rejects them both, and speculates on other approaches. Riggs,
loc. cit. Here, the emphasis is on the theoretical basis for
disharmony rather than to postulate an answer that is probably
both unacceptable and undesirable.
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the result of interest pursuit, development of a broad sense of
community, effective internal interest communication, and per-
ception of the public interest. It is implicit that an integrated
society could not emerge if there were not a balance of order and
freedom-dominant interests operating within it.
Of course, actual "societies" are something less than per-
fectly balanced and therefore something less than completely demo-
cratic. Moreover, the label society often is used loosely to
denote a collection of several societies at one extreme or a mere
collection of people at the other. There is a common misas sump-
tion, too, that nation-states, ipso facto, have national societies.
Thus a concern for democracy should begin with efforts to
perfect the social integration of a group. A society -- that is, a
democratic society --is the foundation for that type of stable
self-government known as democratic government. So-called
democratic institutions are indeed tried and true instruments for
maintaining and perpetuating a social situation. Perhaps they
even have some beneficial effect in building society. But, in
general, they cannot help being irrelevant if there is no society




VII. GOVERNMENT VS. SOCIETY
A valid concern of social man is that in his efforts to
more fully develop society he maintain for himself an outlet for
his individuality. In expressing this concern, some have attacked
society itself as an instrument of conformity leading to homo-
geneity and blandness. The Democratic West looks on Socialist
efforts to create proletarian societies as being mainly concerned
with conformity. Actually, the apparent blandness of the socialist
society is more likely an unintended by-product of governmental
focus on a reduced number of interests of broad effect while
. .
21
denying a wide range of individual interest pursuits to its citizens.
At the other extreme from the conformist society is the society so
excessively pluralistic as to exceed its capacity for person-to-
person interest communication. In a society with many interests,
few of which have broad consensus, anarchy will probably result,
or, if not, at least a serious reduction in government's capacity
for organic action.
In actuality, society is inherently neither an infringement
on man's individuality nor a broadening of his conformist tendencies:
Taking the Soviet society as an example, it is apparent
that the Soviet citizen cannot open his own business, can not




one of its great attractions is that it neither requires conformity
nor does it require individualism. It is as fair to say that social
development increases man's capacity for individual expression
as it is to say that it increases the scope of order. To para-
phrase Niebuhr, through the latter the former is made possible;
through the former the need for the latter is conceived. And
to pursue as a social goal either order or freedom is simply
an expression of ignorance, for it ignores the other variable of
a two -variable equation.
It would appear that there is a marked disparity between
the real world and the model constructed inthis chapter. This
is because the model is normative and is intended to be com-
pared and contrasted to real world conditions (see Chapter V).
Where one finds what is thought of as democracy, this will be
reflected by the model. Of more importance is the use of the
model in situations regarded as non-democratic. Comparison
of the real world with the model discloses with greater precision
that which is missing. It is useful to know, for example,
whether the problem is a non-representative, authoritarian




Thus, to the extent that democracy is a reality, it consists
of a communicating society linked by numerous common interests,
which is aware of and accepts its public interests, and which
governs itself through institutions which relate the individual to
the governing process. Everywhere one looks there is evidence of
the bits and pieces of democracy lying in casual disarray. Here,
there may be a true society, a group capable of perceiving and
expressing a general will but lacking a representative government^
there, there may be a government coterminous with the mood of a
national social grouping -- but not necessarily institutionally re-
23
lated to it; and, in a few places, there are societies with govern-
24
ments institutionally related to the individuals who are the citizens.
The reality is that democracy is characteristically measured
in relative terms. No part of the world -- be it Yemen, the Soviet
Union, or the Peoples' Republic of China -- is unaffected by aspects
of the democratic process. Indeed, the strongest totalitarian
state needs the same kind of foundation as a democratic state --a
22
This might apply to Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example.
23
This might describe the Soviet Union, though, of course, the
real mood of the Soviet people is not subject to outside study.
24 r
The nations of the Democratic West -- the United States,
the United Kingdom, for example.
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highly developed society; but unlike a democracy, the totalitarian
state is at the same time threatened by society since the vitality
of a society is related to interest pursuits of individuals rather
than those conceived of as in the interest of the state.
Nor is there any part of the world which knows the perfec-
tion of democracy. Any minority group which remains essentially
a separate community governed by a larger one is subject to
the tyranny of one group over another that so bothered James
25Madison -- whether it is a tolerable tyranny or not. And any
nation-state that has a low capacity for internal interest communi-
cation usually finds it necessary to fall back on a degree of elite,
or authoritarian, leadership to make up for its inability to take
concerted action.
Democracy, then, is a social norm of unity in diversity
which represents a tolerable balance of order and freedom. This
being the case, it is not solely concerned with the internal affairs
of a particular society. As long as other societies exist -- even
though they are also democratic -- they each represent a threat
to one another by virtue of the fact that they have different interests
25
See the discussion of "Madisonian Democracy" in Chapter
I, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democ:yUic Theory (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1956, Phoenix ed. 1963), pp. 4-33.

74.
and a most imperfect means of resolving those that conflict.
Only a larger social relationship can remove this threat. But
again, the reality of present day existence is that there is no all-
embracive society and, hence, no basis for a larger political
community. Individual interest pursuit is sharply curtailed at
national boundaries and with this limitation the development of a
broader sense of community is slow and uncertain.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing argument has attempted to explain how it is
meaningful for man to pursue unity in diversity through the
medium of society and for society to pursue order in freedom
through the medium of the institutionalized political community.
Democracy is a special norm of these pursuits, applying both to
society and to the political community.- The fact that in the real
world societies enjoy varying degrees of development -- Le.
,
extent of common interests -- accounts for the other fact that
political communities have varying capacities to support what is
thought of as stable democratic self-government. The focus for
nation -building efforts should therefore be on the development of
democratic societies rather than on the imposition of democratic
governmental forms, since the more perfectly democratic these
9
forms, the more precisely will they reflect the disunity,
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instability and lack of common purpose of the supporting society.
How a political community in the real world can in theory
-- but not precisely --be quantitatively analyzed to determine the
degree to which it has realized or can support democracy is the
subject for the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THE BELL CURVE MODEL
The bell curve concept was briefly introduced in Chapter II.
' Now that concept is applied to the theoretical statements of Chapter
III.
Model Construction
In its simplest form, the bell curve model portrays the
balance of order and freedom within a society. As shown in
Figure 4, order is represented on the right hand side, freedom on
the left; the vertical measurements are conceived to represent the
degree of order and freedom.
But, inasmuch as both order and freedom were described
as unmanageable and unmeasureable analytical quantities, the con-
cept of interests was introduced. Order and freedom were replaced
by order -dominant interests and freedom-dominant interests
respectively.
Likewise, consensus with respect to each issue was substituted
for degree of order or freedom because consensus can be measured,
whereas degree of order or freedom cannot. See Figure 5.
This emphasis on measurement is not directed toward achiev
ing mathematical precision in defining and interpreting democracy.
The point is that democracy is too large and vague a concept for
appreciating what is -- in macro -level terms --a fairly precise
set of interdependent variables. Even though the variables cannot
be measured accurately, knowledge of their relationship to one
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Interests, themselves, are scaled in importance along the
abscissa on the basis of the percent of society affected by a par-
ticular interest (this is not to be confused with the measure of
consensus supporting an interest, which is plotted vertically).
Order -dominant interests are scaled in descending order on the
right side of the axis from a maximum of unity (100%); freedom-
2dominant interests are scaled similarly to the left. See Figure 6,
Interests may now be plotted by following a sequence of
steps (see Table I):
Step 1 - Within the subject society, identify and
ennumerate public interests as well as those other
common interests which have a significant impact on that
society. Number and list these interests (columns one
and two, Table I).
Step 2 - Measure the consensus of each interest
and record (column three).
Step 3 - Classify each interest as order-dominant
or as freedom-dominant (columns four and five).
Step 4 - Evaluate the importance of each interest
2 -x^The abscissa of the standard bell curve, y - e , is simply
relabeled: the origin becomes point (0, \) rather than (0, 0) and
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to society, using as a criterion the percent of society
affected by it (column six).
Step 5 - Measure the common consensus of
adjacent interests of each category -- order-dominant
and freedom-dominant -- (adjacent as determined in
step 4 above) (column seven).
Step 6 - Plot the data as follows:
(a) Interest consensus is measured from
to 100 percent, along the ordinate scale;
(b) Order-dominant interests are positive
in sign; freedom -dominant interests are negative;
(c) Interest importance is measured to right
3
or left of the axis.
(d) Interest consensus can now be plotted as
a positive vertical line whose height is proportional
to the degree of consensus; and
(e) Common consensus is plotted in the same
manner with a dotted line to distinguish from indi-
vidual interest consensus plots. (See Figure 7).
"3
By definition, an interest which affects 100% of society
would be of maximum importance; interests of lesser impact would
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Step 7 - Construct three curves:
(a) A standard bell curve to serve as a norm;
(b) Sense of community (gross) which is based
on the plot of individual interest consensus; and
(c) Sense of community (actual) which is based
on the plot of common consensus.
Step 8 - Compare by inspection the two sense of community
curves noting:
(a) Their shapes in comparison to the norm;
(b) The symmetry of one side with respect to the
other; and
(c) The relative density of interests plotted on
each side of the origin.
Step 9 - As a final step in construction of the graphical
model a vertical axis representing the relationship of
government to the various interest groups within the subject
society is erected at the point closest to the mid-point of the
group with which it identifies. In effect, this step adds to
The more integrated a society, the less the importance of a
single interest group and the more valid the concept of the indivi-
dual relating to society as a whole. Nonetheless, the government
may still identify with particular interests rather than interest
groups and such disparity between the overall balance of govern-
ment aims and those of society is one measure of the imperfection
of the government-society relationship.
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the portrayal only a single dimension of the very complex
government-society relationship. It is of greatest meaning
when considering a poorly developed society which embraces
semi-isolated social groups only a small number of which
5
are relevant to the exercise of political power. The
vertical axis indicates with which interests or interest
groups the government identifies.
Figure 7 portrays a more or less "ideal" society: the three
curves -- bell curve norm, gross sense of community and actual
sense of community -- follow a path that differs only in magnitude
of consensus. The society is assumed to be democratic because
the majority of the population is embraced in interest pursuits
that reflect a concern for both order and freedom; it is stable
because the consensus with respect to disparate issues is both a
common consensus and representative of a majority of the popu-
lation. Note, also, that in the ideal case the government axis
is shown to be coincident with the axis of the three curves.
Description
The two fundamental factors of social existence are common
interests and public interests. It is their existence which makes
The purpose of this step is to graphically depict where the
governmental axis actually is with respect to society (as shown by
the sense of community curves); where the governmental axis ought
to be will be discussed later.
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possible the pursuit of multiple individual interests which,
though they may be relatively restricted in scope, may be vir-
tually unrestricted in number and diversity. Thus, the first
step in a bell curve analysis was to identify these interests and
to list them (in columns one and two, Table I).
Actual determination of interest consensus can be accom-
plished either directly by measurement, or indirectly by judgment.
For example, the direct way would apply opinion sampling tech-
niques to each interest identified. This method has been proven
to be fairly accurate when utilized in many Western countries and
might now be employed in other portions of the world. In the
United States, the Gallup, Harris and Roper polls are represen-
tative examples of the method.
A more practical approach is for the analyst to simply judge
these values on the basis of objective and comprehensive study
of the area. If, at some future time, low cost opinion sampling
techniques can be developed, they could be used to supplement
6
"National" interests are not a part of this list. They are
pertinent to international relations and to the personalities of
states, as discussed in Chapter III. However, to the extent that
these survival -dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests of a
state have effect internally on members of society, the effects may
be classified as order-dominant or freedom-dominant, as the case





The classification of interests is accomplished by using
this yardstick: does the interest reflect a primary concern to
conserve or improve order ? Or does it reflect a concern to
maintain or increase freedom ? Like the previous step, this
is a question of judgment, and hard and fast guidelines are not
offered.
However, in arriving at a measure of the relative impor-
tance of interests, a guide is used: importance of an interest
is assumed to be proportional to the percent of a society it
directly affects. The measure may be empirical, if the means
of survey are available and practicable, or it may be subjective,
The final step is one of the most critical and, at the same
time, one of the most inherently difficult: the measuring of
common consensus. As indicated in step 5, common consensus
is a measure of the number of identical persons included in the
consensuses of two adjacent interests. If interests are linked
together not by any similarity of the interests themselves but
instead by the identity of the individuals sharing the interests
7 The results in either case could hardly be termed objec-
tive to the degree that the efforts of independent analysts could
be added together. In theory this would be possible; in fact, the
actual process of interest identification and establishing the
criteria therefor would be subject to the varying judgments of
different analysts.

then a matrix of interests exists which ties the various individuals
together. Since one interest consensus in fact may be comprised,
at least initially, of completely different persons than that of
another, it is important to determine the extent of common con-
sensus in a society in order to learn which interests of a society
ghave a divisive effect and which have a unifying effect. Common
consensus is indicative of a nation's actual sense of community.
It is bound to be less than gross sense of community, because no
two people can be expected to have all the same interests. See
Figure 7, where actual sense of community is depicted as every-
where less than gross sense of community, and compare columns
three and seven, Table I.
Thus, in this final step, it can be seen that the degree to
which all of the major interests of society are linked together, by
elements of a common consensus, is the real measure of the
social fabric. Common consensus is a matrix, an interlocking
web, which can bind even the outer fringes of society to the more
stable center. This explains the underlying appeal of "center -of-
the-road" politics in a highly developed society; at the same time
Q
For example, in the United States the concept of black
separatism is obviously divisive; the question of a particular in-
come maintenance scheme, however, has an unknown effect since
it is not known if the people who would support such a scheme are
a particular group separated from the rest of society or whether
the scheme's supporters also share a significant number of inter-
with the mainstream of American society.
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it illustrates the fallaciousness of the idea that political candidates




The Government -Society Relationship
In Figure 7, a vertical axis said to represent the point in
society where a particular government was institutionalized was
erected. But what does it mean? How should government and
society be related?
It is taken for granted in the West that governments should
be native, that persons comprising a government should be mem-
bers of the society governed. Still, this solves very little -- for
there have been far more home-grown, local varieties of tyranny
(and anarchy) than of the foreign or imperial sort. And it is
because of this that the very hallmark of Western democracy has
been the extraordinary extent to which societies have sought to
protect themselves from their own governments.
However, it is not the means by which government and
society are related which is the point of concern. These
9 Such a dramatic choice in fact represents the two fringes
of society rather than the portion of society -- and it should be the
largest portion -- which has a strong communal matrix.
Means such as majority rule, universal suffrage, one
-
man-one-vote, checks and balances, etc.
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means may be good or bad, democratic or non-democratic de-
pending on the relationship between government and society
which they institutionalize. The relationship is the crucial
measure of political democracy. In a phrase, government ought
to be responsive to the needs of society; this is the proper or
normative relationship. If this condition is achieved, it
makes no difference how complicated or simple, how formal or
informal the institutions or conventions employed.
The significance of using the bell curve for illustrating
such a simple and general proposition is that the needs of
society are already graphically represented in terms of interests
and consensus; and a government shown to be institutionally
related to the portion of society identified with the greater part
of these interests is a more democratic government than one
which represents one extreme or the other. Thus, the axis of
the bell curve of the society which bisects the area of greatest
common interest is the norm for that society. It is irrelevant
that these interests may seem peculiar, superficial or inadequate
Again, the virtue of such a responsive relationship is
dependent on the degree of social development, or integration.
A poorly integrated society is not likely to reach agreement on
what their needs are; a highly integrated society, on the other
hand, by definition has the capacity to defer individual, or private,
interests to the public interest.
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by a different society; it is irrelevant that it was a government
which first made the society aware of or desirous of those needs;
and it is irrelevant if the stimulus which provoked a social need
was of foreign origin.
Thus, with reference to Figure 7, if it can be determined
that a government is responsive to a particular area or class of
interests, then a second vertical axis may be erected. Obviously
it will never really coincide with the norm, or bell curve, axis,
if for no other reason than the unavoidable time lag involved in
democratic processes. Nonetheless, the separation between the
two axes is graphical evidence of the gap, if any, between ideal
democratic government and reality; just as the shape of the sense
of community curve as compared to the bell curve norm is a
measure of democracy within a community.
As noted in Chapter III, reality is usually far removed from
model building. If the bell curve is the normal expression of
democratic society and government, then there are few governments
which can be so described. As a result, in portraying the govern-
ment-society relationship with reference to the bell curve model
there are three axes which should be considered: First, the norm,
which is the bell curve axis; second the axis bisecting the area of
greatest interest density on the actual curve of a society; and
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third, the vertical axis erected nearest the interests with which
an actual government identifies and to which it is responsive ir-
respective of whether or not this responsiveness is in accord
with democratic institutions. Figure 8 illustrates the three
government-society axes.
Discussion
Since the communal matrix of a society is in reality the
strength and breadth of its common interests, it can be seen
that the curve of common consensus which denotes actual sense
of community is synonymous with the communal matrix. If
the matrix is likened to a chain or rope it is obvious that the
ability of a society to internally communicate with itself through
common interests is strongest where common consensus is
highest. In the same fashion, the greater the number of
interests embraced, the greater the diversity of that society.
Thus a society bound together by interests is inherently an
expression of unity in diversity. The question is how much unity,
how much diversity?
Why the bell curve ? There is no mathematical argument
to support the use of the bell curve as the norm of society. It
just seems to lend itself to the theory in a pragmatic way. As
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First, the highest consensus supports interests of the
highest priority. This would mean that the potential for political
action in a state with a socially responsive government would be
highest for the interests of most importance.
Second, it provides for separately classifying and plotting
the two forces which are the fundamental components of any
public interest: freedom and order.
Third, it shows that a society must be composed of people
who individually have an appreciation of the need for both freedom
-
dominant and order -dominant interests. If some individuals pro-
fessed a concern for only one class of interests and other indivi-
duals a concern for the second category, there would be in effect
two separate societies pretending that they were only one -- which,
to a degree, is precisely what has happened in societies that mis-
takenly have conceived of freedom and order as opposite rather
than interdependent goals.
Fourth, the curve includes "fringe" interests supported by
only a weak consensus on either edge of society. This is impor-
tant because it reveals a fact often overlooked in the tyranny of
majority rule: that many of the ideas that keep a society vital
originate on society's fringe as ideas having little mass support.
These interests, then, are important to the health of society and
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must be included within its communal matrix even though they
1
2
may initially enjoy only a small consensus.
Why, one might ask, not posit a plateau, as in Figure 9,
rather than the bell curve as a norm? The answer to this is that
in the nature of things it would set forth a Utopian, or ultimate,
situation which could not bear any resemblance to reality. For
example, if a new idea originated as a low priority interest, the
norm would demand immediate acceptance by a 100 percent con-
sensus. Moreover, although freedom and order -dominant interests
are not inherently opposites, in some cases they are and a plateau-
shaped curve would imply that the interests could not be even
theoretically plotted; for the consensus of one could not possibly
be a part of the consensus of the other without contradicting itself.
The political-social relationship . The actual shape of either
the gross consensus or the common consensus curve of a real
society is likely to bear no resemblance to the bell curve norm.
Why this is so is not the direct concern of this thesis. It is sufficient
to observe that it has to do with a great number of dynamic factors
present in any society -- means of communication, conflict of
12 By definition public interests mubt operate within society;
an interest that seeks to destroy or damage society is extra -social
and must be the responsibility of the government to counter, as it
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social values and institutions, such as religion, low general
educational level, inadequate regulation of private interests,
and so forth. But the implications of different shaped curves
are significant. For example, if the area under the common
consensus curve is divided so that the area on the right of a
vertical axis equals that on the left, then presumably this line
-- the virtual axis --is the line about which a government
responsive to social forces would stabilize itself. See figure 8.
But again in real societies, no matter how democratic,
there is a lag between governmental response to society's needs
and the focal plane of public interests (the virtual axis). Indeed
13
in many cases, the lag is a permanent gap. In other societies,
governmental action may deliberately shift the political axis
further away from the virtual axis. In any case the political axis
should be determined by independent observation and placed on
the graph in accordance with the judgment of the analyst. Although
the mechanics and dynamics of the political-social relationship
are beyond the scope of this thesis, some implications are
apparent.
First, the wider the gap between the virtual axis and the
13
In figure 8, the lag (or gap) is represented by the distance
between the two dotted lines.
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political axis, the greater the tension between government and
society. The government, if responsive to social pressure, can
be expected to undergo changes that will bring it closer to the
virtual axis; if not responsive to social forces, the government
can be expected to increase the coercive force needed to retain
control.
Second, institutions of peaceful change are desirable in
order to institutionalize the government-society relationship and
keep the gap as small as possible.
Third, the absence of institutions of peaceful change be-
tween government and society indicates that if the government's
means of coercion should weaken then there is no reliable means
of avoiding incipient internal conflict.
Thus, in the many nations of the world where the government
is essentially coercive it is not enough to attempt reform by
curtailing government use of coercive power to maintain order.
Such coercion may be tyranny but the reform is likely to produce
anarchy since those same actions also tend to have interest-
starved societies and, consequently, little capacity for self-
imposed order. As a minimum step, an institutional relationship
must be established between society and government. Yet, this
too is hardly enough if the society is so underdeveloped that its
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interest spectrum provides only a weak or non-existant communal
matrix; the step could institutionalize anarchy or at best instability.
More than anything, a society's capacity for self-government
is a direct function of its interest development. And, as has
been already argued, every public interest has either a freedom
component or an order component. The road to democratic self-
government is not a simple one.
Some examples. Figures 10-12 are examples of what
might be expected if certain types of societies were graphed. All
are speculative; none are empirical. Chapter V will discuss a
wider range of examples in terms of their implications for
democracy.
Figure 10 depicts a traditional society, such as existed in
Iran prior to the Shah's reform efforts-. The two "humps" in this
society suggest that there are in reality two societies living side
by side within the same national boundaries. The narrowness of
both humps reflects the underdevelopment (small number of
interests) of the society. The location of the virtual axis is of
no significance to either of the two preponderant groups of the
society. The political axis, stabilized about the order-dominant
interests of the wealthy landholders on the right, is maintained by
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101.
force. The saddle between the two humps represents a weak
communal matrix based on national traditions, culture, and
religion.
Figure 11 shows what might be taken at first glance for
a healthy democratic society with multiple interests and a
government responsive to social forces. However, the distri-
bution of interests is in small pockets of society; the individuals
comprising each of these pockets have only a narrow range of
interests. Therefore the matrix is weakened by the absence of
links between these groups. Such a situation might be assumed to
be what existed in France prior to De Gaulle when political parties
tended to represent a narrow range of interests rather than a
broad spectrum.
Figure 12 shows how a pluralistic democratic society, such
as the United States, might appear if graphed. Note the low con-
sensus on most interests and the preponderance of freedom -dominant
interests with the political axis stabilized in close proximity to the
virtual axis. The combination of interest diversity and low con-
sensus implies a considerable reliance on self -regulation since
governmental action is impeded by the low consensus.
Conclusion. Chapter III and IV have attempted to set forth
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government. Additionally, a theoretical norm has been developed
for the purpose of evaluating the quality of actual governments.
In fact, no such absolute validity is intended since the practical
barriers to accurate and meaningful measurement are probably
insurmountable. What is significant is the knowledge that there
are underlying theoretical bases for quantification and comparison.
While it is obvious that the bell curve model can reveal
nothing that does not in the first instance depend on diligent
research and which could therefore be determined without con-
struction of the curves, the model does have the virtue of pre-
senting a number of complex factors in such relationship to one
another that a brief examination provides visual correlation and
is sufficient to diagnose the potential of a society to support
self-government.
Moreover, while it is not intended to predict events, it can
help to predict the effects of contemplated measures. For ex-
ample, in Figure 10, depicting the traditional society, suppose
that international pressures were brought to bear on the govern-
ment to permit greater civil liberties. All other things being
equal the net result can be expected to be greater instability --
at least initially -- since it increases government responsiveness
to a society that has few common interests and has a weak
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communal matrix between two significantly dissimilar groups.
The implication is that in order to effect reform in such societies
the coercive power of the government will have to be utilized to
avoid anarchy during the period that interest creation is being
stimulated and developed.
How to develop interests or to stimulate their development
is obviously a matter of enormous concern in a world seeking to
stabilize itself. Research in this area is already broad and
vigorous. The bell curve simply reminds one that until
common interests are created, the basis for self-government
does not exist and paternal tyrannies which are dedicated to
social development are perhaps to be preferred to an anarchy
• u 15promising to go nowhere.
14 For example, the efforts to assist developing countries
establish schools, government bureaucracies, economic and social
infrastructures, etc.
This is not to argue that even paternalistic tyranny will be
appreciated, respected or, in the end, tolerated. But see Barrington
Moore, Jr. : "... if we take the seventh decade of the twentieth cen-
tury as our point of observation, while continuing to realize that
like all historical vantage points it is arbitrarily imposed, the
partial truth emerges that nondemocratic and even antidemocratic
modernization works . " (In Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 159.).

CHAPTER V
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELL CURVE MODEL
I. INTRODUCTION
The rich diversity of social settings in the states which
comprise the international system and the different ways in
which national societies are related to their governments would
appear to argue that all states are significantly different in the
vital areas of government form and social organization. The
bell curve model provides a means of graphically depicting both
differences and similarities in a way that can aid both quantitative
and qualitative analysis.
H. LIMITING FORMS
Before considering the use of the model for analytical pur-
poses, the different ways in which curves can depart from the
bell curve norm ought to be considered. These departures might
be thought of as tending towards limits established by the limiting
values which can be assigned to the model variables. As limiting
Cf. Barrington Moore, Jr. , Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) which compares the
revolutionary backgrounds of three Western democracies with the
modernization processes of three Asian states (England, France,
and the United States and China, Japan, and India respectively). See
also Abdul A. Said, Theory of International Relations (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, 1968), particularly "The Impact of the Emer-
gence of the Non-West Upon Theories of International Relations, "
pp. 93-106, and the discussion on pp. 10 - 1 1 ("... it is also impossible






forms, they, of course, bear only an exaggerated relationship
to real-world situations.
If we consider only the four major model variables -- number
of common interests, extent of common consensus, sense of com-
munity, and type of government-society relationship -- and assign
three values to each, a possible total of 81 reference forms results.
If only the two limiting ranges of values are assigned -- an upper
and a lower -- the number of reference forms can be reduced to
16 and they can be thought of as theoretical limits. See Table II
for a listing of possible ranges of values.
Each of the 16 limiting forms need not be examined to see
how they affect interpretation of the curves. However, a sufficient
number of possibilities, including median cases, will be considered
to illustrate how the norm can be used for comparative analysis.
Variations in the Number of Common Interests
Assuming a moderate common consensus, a single -lobe
2
sense of community, and a representative form of government,
variations in the number of common interests would produce curves
which fall between the limiting forms depicted in Figure 13. If
This term as well as "double-lobe" and "multiple -lobe" will
be discussed under "Variations in Sense of Community" in connection
with the explanation of Figure 15.

TABLE II
DATA FOR LIMITING FORMS
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I. Number of
Interests Few* Moderate Numerous 1











Direct* Representative Autocratic 1
(Democratic)
* Values for limiting forms
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social stability is taken to be proportional to the horizontal
3breadth of the curve, it can be seen that stability decreases
as the number of common interests decreases. This in turn
implies that the lower the number of common interests, the more
dangerous becomes direct democratic government and, to a lesser
4
extent, representative government. This is because the impact
of change or disruption to a few important interests in a society
where they are already few in number is considerably more pro-
nounced than would be the case if there were numerous other
5
interests to exercise a moderating effect.
Variations in the Extent of Common Consensus
Figure 14 shows the effect of varying common consensus,
all other variables remaining constant -- that is, number of
common interests is assumed to be moderate, sense of community
to be single -lobed, and type of government to be representative.
3 As was argued in Chapter III, social stability is directly re-
lated to the number of common interests.
Assuming that the more efficient the democratic political
institutions, the more effectively they will reflect the degree of
stability or instability in the supporting society.
e
Note also that the probable effect of a highly intense feeling
with respect to an interest or a group of interests is to exclude those
sharing such intense feelings from a broader range of interests and
thus to promote an inherently unstable situation -- i.e., the fewer
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All three variations are shown to have the same breadth,
with only the height of each curve varying. The implication is
that the meaning of a variation in common consensus can be in-
ferred by comparison of an actual curve with the norm. There
is also an implication with respect to stability for, in addition to
number of common interests, the extent of common consensus is
a direct measure of the stabilizing impact of interests within a
society. The final inference from this family of curves has to
do with a society's ability to influence the course of government:
the higher the consensus, the more influential the society.
Variations in Sense of Community
Reference has been made to single, double, and multiple
lobe sense of community. These terms are peculiar to the bell
curve model, describing the shapes of certain of the reference
curves. The situations which they depict are, of course, real.
Single lobe sense of community refers to a community that
is substantially homogeneous, having a single body of common
interests binding it together. The extent of common consensus
and the number of common interests are not directly relevant to
the condition described.
Double lobe and multiple lobe sense of community describe
non -homogeneous situations in which there are two, or more,

113.
groups of common interests with different people, for the most
part, in the different groups. Thus there is a weak or non-
existent matrix of common interests binding the different groups
together. The basis for the different groups within a single
national society may be ethnical, linguistic, religious, wealth,
or other but the important fact in such cases is that there are an
inadequate number of common interests having a sufficient
common consensus to override the narrower groups of interests.
In other words, the effect of the interests is unifying so far as
the group holding them in common is concerned; so far as other
groups, or society as a whole, are concerned the effect is divisive
since the smaller groups'interests are such as to preclude their
sharing those of the larger group. Figure 15 compares a single
lobe society with a double lobe society. A triple lobe society would
be similar except that the potential for common consensus would
be correspondingly reduced.
Figure 16 shows a double lobe society in which there is a
marked disparity in the common consensus of the two groups. The
basis for such a disparity in most cases probably has more to do
with the basic population figures for each group but it could also
reflect the degree of social integration of the different groups.
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situation is that there is no way in which democratic government
can reflect the interests of society as a whole. In Figure 15, a
mid-point between the two groups pleases nobody, while representing
the interests of one of the two groups amounts to tyranny over the
other. In the situation shown in Figure 16, actual experience would
indicate that either a small oligarchical class tyrannizes the masses
or a majority permanently tyrannizes a minority.
In any case, the presence of a separate group which cannot
integrate or simply has not integrated into the larger society pre-
sents a difficult problem of government. More on this will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
Type of Government -Society Relationship
For ease of classification three kinds of government-society
relationships have been identified. The democratic relationship
is a hypothetical situation in which the government is directly
responsive to the expressed interests of society whether passing
fancy or deeply -felt need. The representative relationship is also
responsive to the expressed interests of society but is accountable
over a prescribed period rather than issue by issue. The auto-
Cf. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Phoenix Edition),
1963), particularly Chapter III, "Polyarchal Democracy" and
Chapter IV, "Equality, Diversity, and Intensity," which discuss




cratic relationship describes all those situations in which govern-
ment is not institutionally accountable to society.
7
In Chapter IV, the government-society axis was discussed
at some length and Figure 8 illustrated three different axes -- the
axis of the bell curve norm, the axis bisecting the area of greatest
common interests, and the axis closest to the group of interests
with which government policy is identified. Figure 17 shows how
these axes relate to a society having a moderate number of common
interests, a moderate common consensus, and a single lobe sense
of community. The displacement between the "direct democratic
axis" and the bell curve axis is a function of the difference between
the actual society and the bell curve norm; the displacement between
the "representative axis" and the "direct democratic axis" can be
due to either a natural lag of the government responding to society
or it can represent a lead a government takes in attempting to
mold society; and, finally, the displacement of the "autocratic axis"
is simply indicative of the fact that government is not institutionally
related to society and is following a different light. In this last case,
if an autocratic government actually were to respond to society's
needs, it's axis might coincide with either of the others, thus
7
pp. 91-92 and pp. 95-98.
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indicating a case of "benevolent despotism" or "guided democracy, "
Figure 18 shows the difficulty inherent in attempting to estab-
lish a government-society relationship in a society having a double
lobe sense of community. There is no theoretically perfect point
at which the government -society relationship "ought" to be stabilized.
Such a condition as that shown in Figure 18 might be said to describe
a traditional society prior to social revolution; if the actual axis
were near the democratic axis, it might describe such a society
after its social revolution. In any case this figure dramatically
illustrates the social imperative associated with democratic govern-
ment: democratic government is impossible with a multiple -lobe
sense of community. Majority rule would be just what Madison
said it was --a tyranny of the majority over a minority, or
minorities.
HI. SOME BELL CURVE MODELS
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to accumulate
the sort of real data with which bell curve models of actual nations
could be prepared. It is possible, however, to construct hypo-
thetical models by substituting non-empirical aggregates for the
needed data. Table III is an example of how this can be done, the
gross values therein being merely estimates made for the sake of
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HYPOTHETICAL AGGREGATE DATA FOR SELECTED NATIONS
Number of Extent of Sense Government -
Common Common of Society
Nation Interests Consensus Community Relationship
Bolivia F M S R
Brazil M(-) L D A
Canada M M D A
China F(-f-) M S A
Congo F L T A
Cuba F H S A
Czechoslovakia M(-) M D A
France N L S R
Greece M M(-) S A
India F(4) L M R
Israel M H S R
Italy N(-) M(-) S R
Japan N H s R
Mexico M(-) M(-) s R
Nigeria F L M A
R.O.K. M(-) H S R
S.V.N. F L M A
Spain M(-) M(-) S A
Sweden N H s R
Taiwan M(-) M s A
Turkey M(-) u-h s R
U.A.R. F(-/) H s A
U.K. N M(-) s R
U.S.A. N M(-) D R
U.S.S.R. M(-) H+) M A
Yugoslavia F(^) L(V-) D A
F--Few L-Low S-Single Lobe D -Democratic
M -Moderate M -Mode rate D -Double Lobe R -Representati\
N-•Numerous H-High M-Multiple Lobe A -Autocratic

122.
data in Table III.
The United States
As shown in Figure 19, the United States has a double lobe
sense of community. In fact, the minor lobe, which represents a
large, unintegrated minority -- the negro population -- might well
be three lobes if Mexican-Americans and American Indians were
8
treated separately. The government, while representative, tends
to be somewhat more liberal than the major lobe of society, a fact
which is indicated by the location of the government-society axis
in the area of freedom -dominant interests.
The camel-back between the two lobes reflects the absence
of a strong matrix connecting the two groups. The low consensus
as compared to the norm implies some difficulty in mobilizing
public support when programs of action are required.
Cuba
Cuba has few common interests compared to most
Western European nations. However, Figure 20 shows a sharp
Q
It is important to remember that the presence of this
lobe is not automatic by virtue of the group's ethnic difference;
the lobe represents interests, not people, and the fact that a
particular group of people in American society have substantially
dissimilar interests from society as a whole -- i.e., they are
unintegrated. Thus, the many other identifiable groups in society
-- ethnic, religious, professional, business, or cultural -- do
not show up as separate lobes because they are integrated into m.
other groups as well.
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spike of high consensus interests which reflects the intense
national feeling with respect to the integrity of Cuba's sovereignty.
The sense of community is essentially single lobe and the auto-
cratic government favors order -dominant interests.
With such a narrow sense of community curve, the society
would tend to be unstable if the government were responsive to
social pressures. This is because the only interests having a
significant consensus are largely emotional ones which are sus-
ceptible to abrupt change. A representative government would
have great difficulty achieving stability until more interests with
greater consensuses grasped the public consciousness.
India
Whether or not India should be represented as having a
multiple lobe sense of community can be debated since it is
difficult to judge whether her polyglot society is a group of
separate societies or a single society with a very low common con-
sensus and having relatively few common interests. This is an
excellent example of a situation where the ability to objectively
measure interests and consensus would allow the bell curve model
9
This spike is characteristic of lesser developed nations
which have few interests but intense national feeling; it might be
thought of as the "throw out the imperialists" curve.
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to aid in the analytical process. That is, if the raw data on
interests were available, comparison with the bell curve norm would
give an immediate interpretation of whether India's problem is one
of developing consensus for existing interests or creating a great
many more common interests -- or both. Figure 21 is based on
the assumption, which may well be incorrect, that India's sense
of community is multiple -lobed. In this case, the depressions
between the different lobes are not so significant with respect to
limiting the matrix of common interests as is the generally low
common consensus. In any case, India's government is fairly
independent of public pressures except with regard to such matters
as food supply and Pakistan. The "spike, " which is characteristic
of underdeveloped countries, is similar to that of Cuba.
South Vietnam
The bell curve model of South Vietnam is both double and triple
lobed with respect to sense of community.. The urban-rural di-
chotomy is sharp but so is the trichotomy of religious sects;
and if all of Vietnam were lumped together there would be at least
one more trichotomy of north (Hanoi), south (Saigon), and center
(Hue). If, in fact, empirical data did result in a curve such as
Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Catholic.
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the one hypothesized in Figure 22, it might be interpreted as
follows: sense of community is multi-lobed with a deficient
matrix of interests to link the whole population; the number of
common interests is low and common consensus is lacking in all
interest areas except that of national security, where there are
two "spikes" reflecting the division of allegience of the population;
the government is autocratic and tends to identify with the more
conservative order -dominant interests; the prospects for political
stability are non-existent for a responsive representative govern-
ment of any political stripe leaving only the alternative of a strong
government substantially free of pressures from social groups.
Sweden
If Sweden's unintegrated Lapp population is omitted, its
sense of community curve follows the bell curve norm closely,
both number of interests and common consensus being above
most other so-called democratic nations. See Figure 23. However,
it will be observed that the curve is translated somewhat to the left
of the norm, reflecting a tendency of Swedish society to favor
freedom -dominant interests. The government-society relationship
is stabilized somewhat to the right, in the area of order-dominant
interests, although the axis is actually a little to the left of the axis
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Authoritarian regimes can give an appearance of greater
unity than may actually be the case. Czechoslovakia, like
Yugoslavia, does not have a single national society. However,
the Czechs and the Slovaks have more common interests than
many societies which are the product of a single culture. Thus,
although Figure 24 shows a double lobe sense of community, the
depression between the lobes is not so sharp -- a matrix of
common interests does exist. From an overall point of view, the
number of common interests is deficient and the common consensus
is only moderate, except on the question of national independence
where a sharp spike is a factor of unity for the whole population.
Note that the entire spectrum of interests is displaced far to the
left, in the region of freedom-dominant interests, while the
government axis has recently experienced several radical shifts
from the region of order -dominant interests to the region of
freedom -dominant interests and back again. The government
itself never lost its autocratic character, though it at one time
showed indications that it might.







What is the relevance of the idea of democracy to the inter-
national system? Is it possible to have democracy at the inter-
national level? Or is it more likely that such a proposition is a
theoretical impossibility? Is it even desirable that the two things
-- democracy and the international system -- be brought together
in some structural relationship?
One point seems obvious: the international system is con-
cerned with states whereas democracy is concerned with people.
Although in certain respects states may appear similar to people
-- even affecting some of their political rights, their individual
attributes, and their emotions -- there is a crucial difference:
states don't really exist; they are legal fictions created by the
various national societies to serve social -- that is, human --
needs. People, on the other hand, do exist; how they are related
to one another and to their governments is what democracy is
about. Thus, the fact that democracy and the international system
have different terms of reference seems a good reason to look
more closely into the questions raised in the opening paragraph.




II . OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The international system might be thought of as a marvellous
imperfection that has evolved over the more than three hundred
years since the Peace of Westphalia and the initial acceptance of
Grotius' eclectic concept of international law. The system has
shown the ability to accommodate such practices as the balancing
of power and the dividing of portions of the world into spheres of
influence. It has tolerated a great variety of bilateral and multi-
lateral arrangements. It has withstood the ambiguity of experiments
in internationalism and regional organization. It has survived a
succession of wars and organized barbarity that have snuffed out
the lives of countless millions and which often have had the effect
of reorganizing the political cartography of the globe. Surely a
form so tolerant of hopeful experiment and which can stand such
abuse and absorb such disintegrative forces and yet still provide
a useful regulatory framework would seem an ideal political form
for so imperfect a creature as man.
The question, however, is not one of tolerability but of suf-
ficiency. Even though the system can provide a framework for
Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625,
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the resolution of conflict, can promote peaceful change (or at
least promote experiments that have that aim), and, on occasion,
can support policing actions by an outraged majority against the
perpetrators of outrage it still cannot ensure that these things
will happen nor can it even provide a reasonable basis for such
a hope. In short, while the international system can be charac-
terized as a necessary arrangement, from the standpoint of
performance it can at the same time be characterized as inadequate.
The members of the international system are, of course,
aware of the system's performance shortcomings. They are also
aware that the system's inability to manage peaceful change threatens
civilization, humanity, even existence. But for a variety of reasons
that are not pertinent to this discussion no alternative has been
found acceptable. Instead efforts of the major powers to make the
system work have been focused on improving statesmanship, re-
cognizing the sources of conflict, and communicating one another's
interests
.
Whether or not the international system can accommodate in-
stitutions which would ensure peaceful change cannot be predicted.
However, the system's two problem areas can be easily identified:
(1) there is no extant sense of community to support mutual trust
and confidence whether between states or between people of
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different states; and (2), the international system is not a system
at all. The latter problem area has to do with cybernetics, or
management theory, and is of interest in this discussion because
feedback --a central requirement of a purposeful, dynamic system
-- is also central to the healthy functioning of democratic govern-
2
ment. The international system has no institutions, lacks purpose
and dynamism, cannot incorporate feedback, and has no centralized
decision-making authority.
The problem of sense of community in the international system
is analogous to the same problem at the national level. The next
section will employ the bell curve model to illustrate its applicability.
III. THE BELL CURVE MODEL AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The examples in Chapter V employed hypothetical data and
a priori assumptions to give a rough idea of how the potential for
7 For a discussion of the relationship of purpose and feedback
to the operation of a system, see Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and
Management (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), especially Part
I, "Basic Notions, " pp. 7-57. A related and fascinating thought
would be to compare the disintegration of societies -- Greek, Roman,
Turkish, etc. -- to the "Cybernetic Theory of Aging, " demonstrating
that it has been the failure of the feedback system to keep pace with
internal growth and developments that accounts for the aging and ul-
timate incapacitation of societies and governments. Also, see David
Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs;
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) which illustrates the applicability of
systems analysis to the study of political systems.
Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International
Level (New York: Doubleday &: Co. , Inc. , Doubleday Short Studies in
Political Science, SSPS #1, 1954).
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democratic government in a given state could be graphically related
to empirical data -- if it were available. The same cannot be done
for the international system except in a very general way that
would only repeat graphically the sort of verbal and written generali-
zations already known. That is to say, meaningful empirical data
on common interests, common consensus and sense of community
in the international system (rather than in the states of that system)
would be most notable in demonstrating the absence of a sense of
community and, therefore, an almost non-existent potential for
democratic government at that level. In theory, of course, the same
procedures and techniques would be applicable; there would, however,
be very little to measure.
For example, one can conceive of a fair number of macro-
level common interests that affect most people everywhere: con-
cern for population pressures, elimination of poverty and disease,
increasing world food supplies, combating large scale environmental
pollution (insecticides, atomic debris, etc.), prevention of general
or nuclear war, protection of scarce natural resources, and so
forth. While these important common interests may have a sub-
stantial common consensus, all except for war and poverty can
conceivably be handled within the system by a combination of
national, bilateral, or international means. Thus, at best the bell
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curve model of the international system would show a sharp spike
and a regional lobe or two. Few common interests, little or no
common consensus and, thus, very little sense of community.
See Figure 25. An international government would necessarily
be tyrannical.
One could argue more convincingly that there are some
regions of the world where the base of common interests and
common consensus is much broader than in the international system
as a whole: for example, Western Europe, Canada -United States,
4
the North Atlantic Basin, and Scandanavia. But these examples
all are in a single region or ocean basin with a uniquely common
heritage and highly developed societies. Integration of some or all
of these societies into a single (or several) larger societies is at
5
least conceivable. Other examples of regions with a credible
potential for democratic government do not come to mind. There
simply are very few places in the world where common interests
and common consensus significantly outrun national boundaries.
This raises the question: Can the process of community integration
4
Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, et al, Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957)
See Karl W. Deutsch, "Regional Organizations as a
Path to Integration, " The Analysis of International Relations
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 181-190; this
chapter is primarily a review of post -World War II regional organi





now focused on national societies, be broadened to focus on
geographic regions or, indeed, on the entire international com-
munity? The next section will discuss the problem of expanding
7
community.
IV. COMMUNITY INTEGRATION: THE MASTER PROBLEM
Theories of community development and integration have been
particularly prevalent in Western political thought since the
Enlightenment. And practically all have had one thing in common:
they have oversimplified the problem of achieving harmony among
men by conceiving of the answer in monistic terms: they argued
that there was but a single key to this age old problem and in
accepting their answer the danger of conflict would be removed
and survival and satisfaction would be ensured. No such easy
answer has proven itself despite the fact that there may have
seemed to many at the time (and, to some, even today) that there
was considerable truth in the various hypotheses.
Rationalism was the father of many theories which were to
follow. In the 18th century Enlightenment it seemed that no
Ibid. , "Attaining and Maintaining Integration, " pp. 191-202.
7
Cf. R. W. VanWagenen, Research in the International
Organization Field (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1952),
Chapter II, " 'Expanding Community' as a Research Focus. "
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problem was too great to withstand man's rational capacity. But
the rationalists neglected to find in man's conduct what should have
been most obvious: man also had -- and made use of -- an
irrational capacity.
The Jacobins, obsessed in their struggle to eliminate the
tyranny of the French monarchy, leaped to the totally unwarranted
conclusion that all that stood between man and the achievement of
harmony was the elimination of tyranny.
In like manner, Adam Smith saw in the "invisible hand" guiding
the free market economy the easy road to a harmony that would
spread deterministically to envelop the whole world --if only restric
tions to the free flow of trade were removed. And the laissez faire
doctrine on which this was based was carried into the 19th century
by a liberal movement which, operating in an environment of order
but not recognizing its existence or necessity, conceived of harmony
as the natural concomitant of liberating man's creative energies.
Freedom defined as liberty was the easy path to universal harmony.
Karl Marx, looked beneath the pretensions of liberal theory,
saw only the evils of unrestrained capitalism, and came up with
his own over-simple answer: dialectical materialism was moving
inexorably towards the elimination of the agent of oppression, the
bourgeoisie and class interests, and only needed a helpful push to

142.
speed the process. Universal proletarianism would remove
classes and therefore class interests and the ugly aspects of man's
nature would be transformed by the transcendent (and redemptive)
act of proletarian revolution. Yet Marx overlooked the fact that
if class interests indeed produced conflict, it was interests that
produced the classes. The problem was more complicated than
he realized.
Easy paths to partial and even universal harmony still persist.
The "grand design" for an Atlantic Community assumes an
overall harmony of interests that is at least in part a product of
wishful thinking.
The concept of supranationalism equates justice with law and
a strong central authority. The need for development of the society
to support such a political structure is seen as a consequence rather
o
than a precondition.
Functionalism seeks to develop the social substructure but
at present its areas of competence are trivial compared to the
Q
Compare the optimism of Joseph Kraft in The Grand Design
(New York: Harper & Co. , 1962) with the resistance of DeGaulle
to Britain's entry into the E.E.C. and the U. S. role in NATO.




meaty concerns of national governments.
And so on, with esperanto, education, technocracy, religion,
and interculturalism. The problem of handling a diversity of factors
typically has been reduced by ignoring many factors or by minimizing
their effect.
Nonetheless, many proven integrative techniques are available.
Language, religion, culture, tradition, and heritage are all means
of creating common interests, though none has universal application.
But at the same time such interests can be factors of diversity just
because of the fact that they are no n -universal. Language confronts
language, religion vies with religion, culture with culture, and so
on. Does this mean that sense of community can never be universal?
Probably, but not necessarily. It has been the mistake of many
scholars to unearth the important integrative factors at work in the
past and to assume that they are the only ones which will be
operative in the future. For example, the church, the family,
language, culture, etc.
Today economic development is looked on as the definitive
10 For example, the specialized .agencies of the United Nations
deal with a number of problems which are of great concern to people
as well as to governments. However, their resources and authority
circumscribe any possibility that in the process of discharging their
functions a larger sense of community will develop. Indeed, in
Deutsch, op cit.
, p. 4, the argument is made that this is "an age of
substitutes" and that nations are less interdependent than ever before.
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community building technique applicable to building national
societies. Yet, for all its acceptance, it has yet to be proven in
any underdeveloped society. Israel would be reassuring evidence
except for the fact that the great number of common ties already
existing at the time of statehood, the great financial support from
without, the diversity of skills available to the new state made the
case unique rather than similar to problems of the newly emerging
nations. Taiwan and South Korea are other examples of nations
that have made great economic progress but which already possessed
societies of ancient standing and, besides, received exceptionally
high infusions of foreign aid. And even were economic development
proven effective in building national socieites, the problem of inter-
national integration would remain.
Conclusion
At the national level nowhere is there in operation a convincing
theory for the rapid transformation of lesser
-developed societies
into integrated societies capable of supporting, democratic government. ll
This is not to belittle the very substantial efforts being
made in many lesser-developed countries to build social and
economic infrastructures, to plan economies, and to raise levels
of education and training. However, with the exceptions of South
Korea, Taiwan, and Israel previously mentioned the pace of develop
ment has been inadequate to prevent the gap between developed and
under




On a regional basis the European Common Market is the only area
which offers promise of broadening the base of common interests
in a region and of simultaneously expanding common consensus.
At the international level, functional cooperation does not appear
to be having an important integrative effect; and supranational
efforts tend to assume that community development would take
place as a consequence of government rather than forming the base
for it.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The international system is composed of a number of inter-
acting political communities responsive in various degrees to the
individuals which make up their societies. The fact that these
communities carry on relations with one another is evidence of the
existence of some common interests; there is also, professedly,
a sense of community of sorts. Therefore, the international com-
munity appears to be at least an inchoate community.
It appears to have as its assets some common interests,
some sense of community, and some institutions of peaceful change.
The task, it would seem, is that of creating more common interests,
more sense of community, and more institutions of peaceful change.
Yet, in Chapter III it was observed that the international com-
munity represents a discontunuity in the hierarchy of people-
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communities. It is a states -community and the interests with
which states are concerned are national interests: sovereignty,
power, prestige, equality, security, etc. And though these interests
are asserted in the name of people -- the respective societies --
they in fact are designed to secure the survival of a form -- the
state -- even though there is no such thing as a state except as it
exists through the acts of people. A state cannot trust another
state: only its officials can trust those of another. One state
cannot have a sense of community for another; this can be mani-
fested only through the sensibilities of persons through the medium
of interests
.
But persons acting for states limit and restrict the develop-
ment of common interests between persons of different states.
Thus there is and can be no lasting basis for common ties between
states, unless common interests between individuals somehow can
be enormously multiplied.
The international system is a misnomer. or at least an
overstatement. Too few interests, too little sense of community,
and inadequate institutions show that it is only a framework for
various sub-systems and cannot much change because of its funda-
mental nature.
At the same time, it can be argued that man is developing a
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belief that he ought to be better served by his political institutions
and that the strength of this belief gains as the communications
revolution expands and intensifies. Many people even assume that
man can be better served. The international system, then, is
suspect not just because of its past catastrophic failures but also
because as a system it is concerned primarily with the well being
of states rather than of people. But man is concerned with both
his survival and his well being and lacks confidence that the inter-
national system can ensure either or that it can avoid another world
war and nuclear annihilation or that it can eliminate endemic
conflict, hunger, and the grosser effects of poverty or that it can
correct the maldistribution of technology and management expertise
or that it can find a tolerable route to economic, social and political
development of the lesser developed countries. In short, one
senses that there is a growing gap between the capabilities of the
system and the expectations /demands of people.
The international system has never had any responsibilities
as a system, let-alone the particular ones enumerated above. Just
the same, people can argue that it ought to have had them and that
it ought to have organized itself to better solve people problems.
This is unlikely to occur. It seems more likely that major problems




There have been three general objectives of this paper:
(1) to construct a model of democracy that relates its promise
to the interest structure of society; (2) to devise a graphical
representation of the model that can serve as a useful proportion-
ing device in assessing the potential of a society to support demo-
cratic government; and (3) to discuss in a speculative way the
implications of the model for democracy at the international level.
I. THE COMMUNITY THEORY
The community theory has attempted to relate the individual
to society normatively. This has been a proximate endeavor
and, as should be the case in all things political and social, it is
purposely tentative. However, it is believed that as experience-
derived changes are incorporated into the theory the framework
derived from the idea of unity in diversity will undergo minimal
transformation.
There are other political relationships which come to mind
Substantively, the norm is flexible. As was argued in
Chapter III, the norm has evolved as a consequence of man's social
existence rather than as a statement of abstract preference; he
may not be aware of the nature of this pursuit, but the evidence of
history can support the conclusion that man in society is, and has
been, pursuing unity in diversity in the form of order in freedom.
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when one reflects on that of individual to society: individual to
government; individual to state; government to state; government
to government; individual to international society; and states,
governments and national societies both to the international system
and to international society. But these relationships must not be
considered in isolation from that of individual to society, since
this is the most fundamental relationship in the hierarchy which
begins with the individual and ends, now, with a community of
legally equal and sovereign states. If the relationship of the
individual to society can be identified with democracy and further
related to a norm, then there exist grounds for hope (1) that
democracy can be intelligently imported and (2) that the implications
of democracy for the international system can be benefically under-
2
stood.
In other words, it has been argued that to the extent that
governments or systems are not necessarily a logical evolution
from the needs of society, or that a well -developed and integrated
society is non-existent, or that a particular government chooses to
ignore the needs and expressions of the society it governs, or that
7
No claim is made that democracy at the international level
is feasible; the question is, what would it involve? How to proceed




there are poorly developed institutional links "between government
3
and society -- then, to that extent, man will be frustrated in his
pursuit of unity in diversity.
Nonetheless, the unrest and conflict which are characteristic
of civilization demonstrate both the nature of the goal and its con-
tinued existence. Man is often diverted by theories which despair
of the pursuit of unity in diversity and advocate acceptance of a
life which is ordered but not free. Also, man is stirred to the
passionate pursuit of liberty at the expense of order. Yet both
extremes do acknowledge the fact that the other force is also con-
tending within man; both extremes recognize that neither tyranny
nor anarchy are acceptable conditions; but, just the same, man
is forever to be found methodically introducing the one condition
or the other and justifying his actions on the basis of pessimistic
rationalization, if not self-serving argument.
In the past, society and government occasionally have been
brought into a complementary relationship and a more tolerable
balance of order and freedom has been the result. But as the
conditions changed, man's inability to comprehend the complexities
3
It is recognized that one or another of these conditions has
usually been the case over the space of recorded history, and that




of his political and social environment -- and so to discover that
the basis of the "good society" is a balance of order and freedom
achieved through the medium of interest pursuit -- have often led
him to actions which have destroyed the basis for such balance as
had existed.
For as already noted, order and freedom are social creations
growing out of interest pursuit. Tyranny is not a lot of order but,
rather the absence of freedom; anarchy is not a lot of freedom, but,
instead the absence of order. Pursuing this logic, it follows that
tyranny may be diminished by increasing freedom rather than by
reducing order; that anarchy may be diminished by increasing order
rather than by curtailing freedom. Thus, because order and
freedom are manifested in terms of interests and because a society
is created through interest pursuit, the greater the number and
diversity of interests and the more effectively interests are com-
municated, the greater the potential for order and freedom and the
4
more stable the society. Under these conditions, the relative
importance of a single interest, or just a few, is much less to
society as a whole than is the case when interests are few in number
and diversity.
See Chapter III, p. 56. Also, Chapter V, pages 110 and 112.
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On the other hand, a characteristic of the traditional auto-
cratic state and most of the lesser developed countries is the
narrow range of common interests pursued. This is why they can
undergo such violent disruption as the result of a solitary event or
issue -- the death of an important figure, cancellation of a large
commercial agreement, the charismatic leadership of a demagogue,
etc.
With respect to this traditional society and its narrow range
of interests, it must be remembered that social instability is not
necessarily a reflection on the government -- irrespective of
whether its character is considered "good" or "bad" subjectively.
For if a society is inherently unstable, governmental stability
must be based to some extent on forces outside of society -- for
example, an army or a national police force. Indeed, the appli-
cation of democratic institutions and representative government
to a traditional society affected by intense pressures for moderniza-
tion, social change, and political self-expression simply ensure
that the government will be precisely as unstable as its supporting
society. It is the absence of internal interest pursuits which
ensures a lack of order and thus keeps anarchy just around the
corner. And it is also the absence of internal interest pursuits
which ensures a lack of freedom and thus causes even necessary
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governmental acts of self -survival to take on the appearance of
tyranny.
Even highly developed democratic societies have been known
to confuse liberty -- which is just a prerequisite for interest
pursuit -- with freedom -- which is a social result of pursuing
interests. Some groups in nearly all Western societies are
prone to make this mistake, worshipping conspicuously at the
altar of a "freedom" which is no more than a highly exaggerated
expression of liberty.
On the other hand, the worship of order is a weakness of
those who confuse it with restraint, failing to note that order,
too, is interest derived. Thus authoritarian regimes typically
do not appreciate the fact that it is not order which produces pro-
gress, but the pursuit of interests within a framework of order
and freedom.
The community theory argument has attempted to place the
foregoing complexities of social existence in a positive relation-
ship to the universal norm of unity in diversity. The theory is
oriented towards the notion that man lives in a problem-solving
environment, that the most difficult problems are social in origin
and that solutions are by nature relative rather than objective.
Imperfection, ambiguity and ambivalence have been said to
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characterize social existence and politics has been described as
the process by which man, in light of the above, attempts to find
purpose through the pursuit of unity in diversity in its order-
freedom manifestation.
II . THE BELL CURVE MODEL
The bell curve model of Chapter IV simplifies the community
theory argument of Chapter III in most respects but one: the
addition of the bell curve as the norm of democratic society. The
model, which can be used to compare one nation /society with
another, is obviously of greater validity from a qualitative stand-
point than from a quantitative standpoint. This is so because of
the difficulty in devising uniform standards for interest identifi-
cation where two or more different societies are involved. More
research will be required to resolve this problem of data collection,
interpretation and reconciliation.
In any event, no pretense is made that democracy can be
objectified, quantified, and assigned numbers for bureaucrats to
collect and store away. The model has its greatest value when
used by the serious student to organize and interpret data with
respect to states and societies under study.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The bell curve model has served to emphasize one of man's

15 5.
oldest reservations with respect to democracy: the problem of
tyranny of or by a minority. If two or more groups, which appear
to comprise a larger group, in fact are for the most part extra
-
social with respect to one another there is no governmental system
yet devised which can be responsive to the interests of both or all
the groups since by definition (of extra -sociality) they lack a
substantial area of common interest. Because the justification
5
for legal jurisdiction is directly related to intra-social situations,
it follows that for an unrepresented group within society no legal
regime can be just even though the legal principles are, from an
objective standpoint, equally applicable
.
James Madison labored with the problem of tyranny within a
democracy in The Federalist Papers when he considered the
problem of tyranny and the dangers of .concentration of power. His
answer, in effect, was to assume that factions, and hence the
danger of tyranny, could not be avoided and to devise a system of
checks and balances to protect against the abuse of power. In effect,
his concept of society was that it was inherently multi-lobed; he did
See Constantine Kojouharoff, Niccolo Machiavelli (Washington,
D.C.: National University Law Review, 1930), pp. 40-41.
TheFederalist Papers (New York: New American Library




not recognize the possibility of interests creating a single-lobe
society.
Jean Jacques Rosseau implicitly recognized the relationship
of democratic government and single lobe sense of community when
he theorized that a democratic community was necessarily limited
7
in size. Both of these views have implications for democracy at
the international level.
It is plainly Utopian to expect the development of a world
society linked by common interests of such number and quality as
to create a single lobe sense of community which approaches the
bell curve norm. And even if development appeared feasible, it
would appear to challenge theories of span-of-attention (as regards
the individual) and span-of -control (as regards government).
Given the diversity of social forms in the world and the
absence of any mandate to reduce this diversity, it would appear
desirable to preserve the international system. But what of the
fact that the member states are, in effect, extra-social with respect
to one another ?
Here we finally are brought face to face with the reality that
7 Rousseau was concerned with the necessity for an individual
to represent himself: Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract, '
Section 17 in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (N. Y. :
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), pp. 460-462.
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there is no good solution to the problem of democracy at the inter-
national level. The international system is indicated because the
idea of a universal society which could support supranational
democratic government is, at the moment, impossible to conceive.
Even though a rudimentary universal value system were to evolve,
it still would be necessary to preserve a buffer between the various
social groupings of the world with their widely differing cultures,
levels of social integration, and attitudes towards government.
One can hope, however, that the Madisonian solution of checks and
balances will eventually find expression in the international system
and in so doing allow for the preservation of international diversity
while promising a greater measure of international unity.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Samuel P. Huntington closes his* book, The Common Defense ,
by quoting Fisher Ames:
A monarchy or despotism. . . is like a full-rigged
sailing ship. It moves swiftly and efficiently.
It is beautiful to behold. It responds sharply to
the helm. But in troubled waters, when it strikes
a rock, its shell is pierced, and it quickly sinks
to the bottom. A republic, however, is like a
raft: slow, ungainly, impossible to steer, no
place from which to control events, and yet en-
durable and safe. It will not sink, but one's
o
feet are always wet. °
° Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 447.
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Ames made his remarks in 1795 yet the insight they reflect
seems as valid today as then. Making democracy work will never
be easy nor will the effort be glamorous. But the creation of
democratic societies is necessary to the balancing of order and
freedom and -- ultimately -- to the attainment of unity in diversity,
And if "one's feet are always wet" in this pursuit at the national
level, one can hardly expect the pursuit of unity in diversity at the
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